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ABSTRACT
Labor abuses in China have drawn international condemnation 
and led to increasing domestic unrest. Government, business and 
unions in the United States have insisted that Chinese law needs to 
be reformed to deal with those abuses but they fail to identify 
precisely what reforms are required.  
This article aims to shift debates about reforming Chinese labor 
law in the United States to a much greater level of specificity. The 
discussion focuses on two very prevalent abuses that are 
purportedly prohibited by existing labor regulation: underpayment 
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2of wages and excessive working hours. The article analyses in 
detail those aspects of China’s labor laws and labor institutions 
contributing to pervasive non-compliance. I find that the Chinese 
regulatory framework is undermined by a profusion of imprecise 
and sometimes contradictory legal rules, a bureaucratic ‘command 
and control’ approach to inspection and dispute resolution, and a 
narrow and ineffective range of tools for inducing compliance. 
Drawing on successful international examples of regulatory 
innovation, as well as recent creative Chinese experiments in labor 
enforcement, I propose a range of regulatory initiatives that have 
realistic prospects of inducing greater adherence to the law in 
China’s current political and economic context. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
China’s extraordinary economic success is marred by widespread 
labor abuses, epitomized by the manufacturing sweatshop staffed 
by ill-treated workers migrating from China’s hinterland.2 Many 
kinds of abuse occur in apparent defiance of Chinese labor law.
Firms breach labor contracts and wage regulations by underpaying 
2 See ANITA CHAN, CHINA'S WORKERS UNDER ASSAULT: THE EXPLOITATION OF 
LABOR IN A GLOBALIZING ECONOMY (2001); KAI-MING LIU & SHEN TAN, 
KUAGUO GONGSI DE SHEHUI ZEREN YU ZHONGGUO SHEHUI [Corporate 
Social Responsibility in China] (2003);  STEPHEN FROST, WORKERS' RIGHTS 
FOR THE NEW CENTURY 16-36 (2002).
5their employees for work performed, or not paying them at all. 
They violate legal provisions on working hours by requiring staff to
work for extreme periods of time without rest. They ignore health 
and safety law by operating egregiously dangerous workplaces.
In the United States, the Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China,3 the United States Council for International Business
(USCIB)4 and Human Rights Watch,5 among other organizations, 
have all highlighted China’s systemic inability to enforce its labor 
3 The Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) was established 
by Congress in the U.S.-China Relations Act 2000  (22 U.S.C. Chapter 77 
Subchapter II). The CECC monitors human rights and the development of the 
rule of law in China. It consists of nine Senators, nine members of  the House 
of Representatives and five  Administration officials appointed by the 
President. See, e.g. the CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, 
ANNUAL REPORT 36-43 (2005).
4 Business Letter from United States Council for International Business to 
President Bush on AFL-CIO China Trade Complaint (Apr. 7, 2004) available 
at http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?DocumentID=2864.
5 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT, 247 (2006).
6law and the detrimental effect this has on Chinese workers. The
American labor movement has gone further. The movement’s 
largest peak body, the AFL-CIO, has claimed that China is not only 
failing to protect its own citizens, it is wrongfully causing major 
economic damage to the United States. The AFL-CIO argues that
Chinese employers are undercutting competitors (including 
American competitors) by reducing labor costs far below the level 
that would prevail in China if the law was properly implemented. 
On the basis of this argument, the AFL-CIO petitioned the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR) in 2004 to initiate an 
investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act.6 The petition set 
out in detail a range of labor abuses and then, using various 
6 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2000). Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (as amended) 
authorizes the United States Trade Representative to impose trade sanctions 
against countries that ‘burden or restrict’ U.S. commerce by engaging in 
unreasonable trade practices. Unreasonable trade practices are defined to 
include ‘a persistent pattern of conduct that … fails to provide standards for 
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health of 
workers.’: id § 2411 (d)(3)(B)(iii).
7economic models, claimed that China’s unfair cost advantage over 
US manufacturing had led to the displacement of some 727,000 
jobs.7 The AFL-CIO sought remedies including the imposition of 
trade sanctions commensurate with the cost advantage caused by 
the labor abuses.
The AFL-CIO’s petition was opposed by USCIB
8
 and rejected by 
the USTR on the basis that the imposition of sanctions was 
counterproductive and would have disastrous domestic economic 
7 See Section 301 Petition of American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations, (U.S. Trade Representative), filed with the United 
States Trade Representative on Mar. 16, 2004, available at
http://www.aflcio.org/issuespolitics/globaleconomy/upload/china_ petition.pdf.
The petition is discussed in Developments in the Law -- Jobs and Borders: III.
Legal Tools for Altering Labor Conditions Abroad 118 HARV. L. REV. 2202, 
2216-2217.
8 Business Letter from United States Council for International Business to 
President Bush on AFL-CIO China Trade Complaint (Apr. 7, 2004) available 
at http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?DocumentID=2864.
8consequences.
9
Both maintained that the preferable path to 
improving labor conditions in China was, in the USCIB’s words, 
‘increasing economic and non-economic engagement’.10 The merits 
of the AFL-CIO’s claims about the economic effects of Chinese 
labor abuses were not subject to rigorous investigation and the
matter remains unresolved.
Irrespective of whether the United States should best respond to 
China’s labor abuses through engagement or through the imposition 
9 Rejected by the Office of the United States Trade Representative on Apr. 28th 
2004: 69 Fed.Reg. 26204-5 (2004).The USTR stated that ‘the initiation of an 
investigation […] would not further Administration efforts to improve 
workers’ rights in China and, to the contrary, that initiation would instead 
hamper those efforts’: id  at 26205.
10
 Shortly after the AFL-CIO’s petition was rejected, the U.S. and China signed 
four Joint Letters of Understanding for cooperation between American and 
Chinese agencies in relation to labor issues, including enforcement of wage 
and hours regulation and workplace safety laws. US Department of Labor
The U.S. Department of Labor and The People’s Republic of China Sign Four 
Joint Letters of Understanding (Press Release, Jun. 21, 2004). 
9of trade sanctions, a comprehensive analysis of the deficiencies of 
Chinese legal framework is a prerequisite to generating concrete 
reform proposals and demands. Unfortunately, advocates of both 
the engagement and sanctions approaches have operated at a level 
of generality that makes it difficult to implement or evaluate a 
practical strategy for improving labor conditions in China. It is not 
adequate to refer vaguely to improving human rights and the rule of 
law; if a co-operative approach is to be adopted, precisely which 
aspects of China’s labor law framework should be a priority for 
international collaboration? How do we assess whether the 
cooperation has yielded any tangible benefits? Alternatively, if 
sanctions are to be threatened, what precise demands are to be 
made of China? No legal system can achieve perfect compliance, 
let alone one in a developing country. What then is it reasonable to 
insist that China do?
Moreover, neither approach sufficiently acknowledges the extent of 
labor law reform now underway in China, perhaps because much of 
this reform is occurring at a decentralized level. The domestic 
10
pressure for reform is powerful and increasing. Workers dissatisfied 
with the lack of remedies for their mistreatment are resorting ever 
more frequently to self-help measures such as spontaneous protests, 
many of which turn violent.11 These events are sufficiently serious 
to induce government officials and labor law scholars to develop an 
array of proposals for improving law enforcement. Some are ill-
considered and makeshift. Others are carefully crafted and highly
sophisticated. Having some potential to elicit broader compliance 
with the law, such proposals merit international recognition, 
examination and, where justified, support.
This article aims to shift debates about Chinese labor law in the 
United States and other developed countries to a much greater level 
of specificity. I undertake a detailed and systematic analysis of 
those aspects of China’s labor laws and labor institutions 
contributing to pervasive non-compliance. I find that the Chinese 
regulatory framework is undermined by a profusion of imprecise 
11 See, e.g. China Rioters Clash With Police Over Unpaid Wages, AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESSE, Sep. 30 2005.
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and sometimes contradictory legal rules, a bureaucratic ‘command 
and control’ approach to inspection and dispute resolution, and a 
narrow and ineffective range of tools for inducing compliance. 
The legal material relevant to China’s labor abuses is vast and the 
associated issues highly complex, so it is necessary to choose 
specific abuses to render the analysis manageable. This article 
focuses on two: underpayment of wages for work performed12 and 
prolonged periods of excessive working hours.13 These specific 
abuses have been selected for three reasons. First, they are among 
the most common labor abuses, affecting many millions of 
workers. Second, they are, at least at first glance, violations of 
12
 Prohibited by Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa [Labor Law of the 
People's Republic of China] (hereafter ‘Labor Law’), passed by the National 
People’s Congress July 5, 1994 with effect from May 1, 1995, arts. 17, 50, 
91. 
13
 Prohibited by Labor Law arts. 36-45 and 90.
12
existing Chinese law.14 The National People’s Congress, the 
highest organ of the Chinese state, has purported to prohibit these 
abuses and has directed the official trade unions to act to prevent 
them.15 Thus there is political commitment to combat them. The 
abuses therefore directly raise the central question of this article: 
why, given this commitment, is the law not enforced? 
Third, underpayment of wages and prolonged periods of 
excessive working hours are both practices which are generally 
agreed, within and outside China, to be unjustifiable. T hey are not 
technical or tolerable breaches of the law. True, there is much 
controversy among scholars and policy-makers about how far the 
14
 Of course, several other labor practices, particularly denial of the right to 
organize trade unions outside the official government structure, constitute 
labor abuses according to international labor standards, but not according to 
Chinese law.
15 See e.g., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa [Trade Union Law of the 
People's Republic of China] (hereafter Trade Union Law), passed by the 
National People’s Congress on April 3, 1992 and revised October 27, 2001, 
with effect from that date, art. 22.
13
state should intervene, if at all, in setting wages and working hours. 
Some neo-liberal lawyers and economists, for example, believe that 
minimum wages are counter-productive,16 in which case their non-
observance is unproblematic, even desirable. However, even on this 
neo-liberal view, the problem of wage arrears in China must be 
addressed, because it is not simply a case of payment below the 
minimum wage; frequently workers are not paid at all for work 
performed. The issue goes fundamentally to the enforceability of 
contracts, which neo-liberals, too, uphold.17 Likewise, some object
to setting working hours at low levels unsupported by clear health 
and safety rationales.18 These objections lose their force, in the case 
16
 For a succinct outline of this argument, see, e.g. RICHARD POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 361-65 (5th ed. 1998). For a more positive 
evaluation of minimum wages, see, e.g. UNITED KINGDOM LOW PAY 
COMMISSION, NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE: LOW PAY COMMISSION REPORT 
2005 (2005).
17 POSNER, supra note 16 at 101-108. 
18
 As is well known, arguments against certain forms of hours regulation appear 
in the majority judgment in Lochner v. People of State of New York, 198 U.S. 
45 (1905) (restrictions on working hours of bakers were an unconstitutional 
14
of Chinese working hours violations, because in very many 
instances the violations are demonstrably injurious to health.
This article is structured as follows. Part II of the paper briefly 
describes the extent of underpayment of wages and working hours 
abuses in China. Part III concentrates on the internal structure of 
the legal rules and legal institutions that regulate work, especially 
with respect to remuneration and working hours. I analyze the 
production of legal rules, the enforcement work of the bureaucracy, 
the principal labor dispute resolution institutions, and the functions 
of the official trade union organization (which I treat as a quasi-
regulatory agency). I conclude by discussing a promising regional 
initiative.
In Part IV, I sketch out several reform proposals. Drawing on 
successful international examples of regulatory innovation, as well 
as recent creative Chinese experiments in labor enforcement, I 
interference on the right of contract between employer and employee and not 
justified by health considerations). 
15
propose regulatory initiatives that have realistic prospects of 
inducing greater adherence to the law in China’s current political 
and economic context. 
Of course, no legal reforms will definitively close the gap 
between the letter of labor law and workplace practice. Deficient 
implementation of, and compliance with, law is universal. Even in 
developed countries, labor regulation19 frequently fails to induce 
19
 ‘Regulation’ has, to say the least, a variety of meanings: Julia Black, 
Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-
Regulation in a Post-Regulating World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 103, 
128-142 (2001).  In this paper, I generally use the term to refer to state-based 
law, unless I indicate that a broader sense of regulation is intended. Labor
regulation refers to regulation pertaining to work relations.  It includes what 
in common law countries would be considered ‘private law’. The distinction 
between ‘regulation’ and ‘common law’ is not helpful in the context of this 
paper for several reasons. First, ‘private law’ even in common law countries, 
can be analysed as a form of regulation: see e.g., Hugh Collins, Regulating 
Contract Law, in REGULATING LAW 13, 17-28 (Christine Parker et al. eds., 
2004), not least in the context of labor relations: Richard Johnstone & 
Richard Mitchell, Regulating Work, in REGULATING LAW 101 (Christine 
16
change in workplaces or has provoked unintended changes.20 This 
is unsurprising: work relations are characterized by diverse social 
systems or frames of reference. Workplace participants determine 
their actions not just with a view to legal validity, but also, or even 
more so, on the basis of matters such as cost-benefit calculations, 
concordance with organizational decision-making and politics,
consistency with local ‘custom and practice’ and perspectives about 
appropriate gender roles. In light of this complexity, attempts to 
Parker et al. eds., 2004). Second, as the discussion in this article makes clear, 
Chinese law pertaining to labor contracts has not emerged from the general 
law of contracts but has been created by the Labor Law simultaneously with 
the establishment of ‘regulatory’ labor standards. Third, the labor abuses we 
are concerned with here traverse both (in common law terms) ‘private law’ 
and state based regulation. Thus, failure to pay agreed wages is at the same 
time a breach of contract (viewed as an aspect of private law in Western 
systems) and  a matter for administrative sanction.    
20 See e.g., the studies in REFLEXIVE LABOR LAW (Roger Rogowski ed., 1994). 
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invoke law to achieve a change in work relations practices may be 
ineffective, counterproductive and/or incoherent.21
Nonetheless, there is now a rich literature, based on regulatory 
experience in the United States and other developed countries, that 
identifies which forms of legal interventions are more likely to 
achieve positive outcomes in a given context. This literature 
informs my discussion of reform in China. Regulatory scholars 
have suggested that, in many circumstances, ‘responsive’, 
‘reflexive’ or ‘decentered’ forms of regulation have proved to be 
superior alternatives to traditional ‘command and control’ style 
rule-making, with its emphasis on state-based standard setting, 
coupled with the imposition of sanctions. Chinese labor law heavily 
emphasizes ‘command and control’ and so there is certainly a need 
21
 This is the ‘regulatory trilemma’: Christine Parker et al., Introduction, in
REGULATING LAW 1 (Christine Parker et al. eds., 2004); Gunther Teubner, 
Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in JURIDIFICATION OF 
SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR, 
CORPORATE, ANTITRUST, AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAW (Gunther Teubner ed., 
1987); HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 68-9 (1999). 
18
to consider alternative approaches. Unfortunately, the Chinese 
political and economic context –particularly the repression of 
independent civil society organizations, such as free labor unions, –
is a major obstacle to some of the most responsive and participative 
forms of regulation.
II. ALL WORK AND NO PAY
Underpayment (or non-payment) of wages and the working of 
excessive hours are both widespread in China. Wage arrears are 
common in all parts of the economy.22 Even according to official 
Chinese estimates,23 nearly 100 billion yuan (USD 12 billion) is
22Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, United States Department 
of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (2004), 
released Feb 28, 2005, Section 6.
23
 Much labor data in China remains secret, including information about wages, 
corruption and strikes produced by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
and the All China Federation of Trade Unions: Human Rights in China & 
China Labor Bulletin, Labor and State Secrets, 3 CHINA RIGHTS FORUM 23 
(2004).
19
owed to migrant workers.24 While arrears occur frequently in the 
state-owned parts of the economy, non-payment of wages in the 
private sector is an increasingly acute problem. This is because the 
private sector, with its vast numbers of business entities and 
manifold organizational forms, is now the most significant 
employer of labor in the Chinese economy.25 An International 
24
‘Defaulting Wage Payment should be Incriminated’¸ Xinhua News Agency 
March 8, 2005, available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/null/122105.htm
25
 The statistics on the relationship between firms and employment are 
confusing. For a thorough analysis of the available data from the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, see the 2004 Asian Development 
Bank Institute study: TOSHIKI KANAMORI & ZHIJUN ZHAO, ASIAN 
DEVELOPMENT BANK INSTITUTE, PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2004). The authors conclude that some 69 
million people were employed in state owned enterprises in 2003 (down from 
a high of 113 million in 1995). This contrasts with around 90 million 
employed in domestic private enterprises (up from 2.5 million in 1981).  It 
would seem from another set of (inconsistent) data cited by the authors, there 
are about 38 million employed in collective enterprises, 10 million in firms 
operated by Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwanese investors and 6.4 million in 
other foreign invested firms. The authors conclude that there are 30 million 
20
Labor Organization (ILO) study reports that anywhere from 50% to 
80% of private enterprises in Guangdong Province, China’s 
manufacturing powerhouse, illegally retain wages.26 The practice is 
so prevalent it is sometimes described as a ‘local custom’.27
Most importantly, underpayments in the private sector occur not 
simply because firms are in economic difficulty (and therefore 
unable to comply with their legal obligations). In many cases it is 
simply fraudulent and manipulative conduct on the part of the 
business entities in China, some 90% of them private. It is not clear how 
many of these are also employers. For an analysis of the management 
structures of the different firm types from an industrial relations perspective, 
see BILL TAYLOR ET AL., INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN CHINA 47-76 (2003). See 
also Ying Zhu, Economic Reform and Labor Market Regulation in China, in
LAW AND LABOR MARKET REGULATION IN EAST ASIA (Sean Cooney et al. 
eds., 2002).
26
 Gerard Greenfield & Tim Pringle, The Challenge of Wage Arrears in China,
in PAYING ATTENTION TO WAGES 30, 35 (Manuel Simon Velasco eds., 2002).
27 Id.
21
debtor employer.28 For example, it is common for employers to
demand that workers pay a bond prior to commencing work.29 This 
practice, together with the retention of wages, is used extensively in 
order to impose labor discipline and prevent staff turnover, 
especially during holiday periods.30
Turning to long working hours, these occur most prominently in 
export-oriented manufacturing industry, where young female 
workers predominate.31 Some surveys suggest that at least half of 
28 See e.g., Anita Chan, Labor Standards and Human Rights: the Case of 
Chinese Workers under Market Socialism, 1998 HUM. RTS. Q. 886, at 891-
893.
29 Id. at 889-891; Anita Chan, Globalization, China's Free (Read Bonded) Labor 
Market and the Chinese Trade Unions, 6 (3-4) ASIA PACIFIC BUS. REV. 260, 
261-268 (2000). In Chan’s 1996 survey of 54 private sector footwear 
factories, more than 58% of migrant workers on the production line paid 
bonds: id.
30
 Greenfield & Pringle, supra note 26, at 35.
31 LANCE COMPA, AMERICAN CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL LABOR SOLIDARITY,
JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE STRUGGLE FOR WORKER RIGHTS IN CHINA 38-44 
22
private enterprises do not comply with working hour regulations.32
In many clothing industry firms in Guangdong Province, workers 
are required to work long hours every day for weeks during ‘peak’ 
season [wangji] in order to meet client orders. Some staff are 
required to work for 48 hours straight,33 and overtime (usually paid 
unlawfully at ordinary rates, if it is paid at all) reaches 150-200 
hours per month.34 This latter figure translates to working weeks of 
(2005); Ching Kwan Lee, From Organized Dependence to Disorganized 
Despotism: Changing Labor Relations in Chinese Factories, 157 THE CHINA 
QUARTERLY 44, 50-55 (1999).
32 According to one set of  All China Federation of Trade Union (ACFTU)
statistics (not renowned for their reliability), only 15.8% of private 
enterprises obey working hour regulations, most workers are not paid 
overtime and workers have an average 50 hours per week: CHINA DAILY,
August 14, 2003 <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-
08/14/content_254678.htm>. 
33 The End of the MFA and the Rising Tide of Labor Disputes in China, 1 (11) 
CSR ASIA WEEKLY. 
34 See e.g., KAI-MING LIU & SHEN TAN, KUAGUO GONGSI DE SHEHUI ZEREN YU 
ZHONGGUO SHEHUI [Corporate Social Responsibility in China] 83- 85 (2003); 
see also Minghua Zhao & Jackie West, Rural Female Labor in Chinese State 
23
seventy to ninety hours, well in excess of the legal maximum of 
around 50 hours.35 These practices (especially in firms with East 
Asian employers) are often accompanied by authoritarian 
management behaviors where staff activities during working time 
are closely controlled.36
To be sure, some workers actively seek longer hours in order to 
maximize their earnings.37 However, the recorded stories of many 
Cotton Mills, in WOMEN AND WORK IN GLOBALISING ASIA 175-179 (Dong-
Sook Gills & Nicola Piper eds., 2002). In the ‘off’ season [danji], on the 
other hand, workers are laid off in large numbers. 
35 See infra Part III.A.4.
36 CHAN, supra note 2, at 46-81; Mary Gallagher, Time is Money, Efficiency is 
Life. The Transformation of Labor Relations in China, 39(2) STUDIES IN 
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 11, 33-35 (2004).
37
 Asian Labor News reports an instance of a mass worker protest because a 
firm, pressured by its US customers, attempted to reduce hours to 60 per 
week: Workers Riot for the Right to Work Overtime: 
<http://www.asianlabor.org/archives/001832.php>. Commenting on the 
report, Stephen Frost, editor of the news service, points out that the workers 
24
other individual Chinese workers, as well as more general data, 
illustrate not only that long hours are widely resented, but that they 
frequently lead to poor physical and mental health and the erosion 
of personal and family life.38 This is consonant with the 
preponderance of international empirical studies on the effects of 
long working hours, those effects being increasingly significant 
once a person is consistently working more than 50 hours a week 
(depending on the nature of the job and other factors).39
themselves were not involved in the negotiations and that the relationship 
between wages and hours was not clarified. There is, of course, a link 
between the two abusive labor practices considered here since poor and 
unreliable remuneration induces many workers to work for longer hours than 
they otherwise would if they received their lawful and agreed entitlements.
38 See e.g., the stories collected in CHAN, supra note 2;  Anita Chan, Culture of 
Survival: Lives of Migrant Workers through the Prism of Private Letters, in
POPULAR CHINA 163 (Perry Link et al. eds., 2002); at the China Working 
Women Network: <http://www.cwwn.org/chisimp/chisimp_main.html>. 
39
 For a comprehensive review of the international evidence on the link between 
extended hours of work, health and quality of family life, see the decision of 
the Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission in the 
Working Hours Case, PR072002 available at 
25
One group of Chinese workers is particularly vulnerable to wage 
arrears and long working hours: migrant laborers (that is, workers 
migrating from China’s rural areas or nongmingong). They are 
regularly accorded treatment inferior to their urban counterparts.  It 
is they who bear the brunt of labor abuses, including 
underpayments and excessive working hours.40
<http://www.airc.gov.au/documents/full_bench/full_bench_decisions.html>, 
especially at [120]-[179].
40
 The poor treatment of migrant workers has been widely chronicled: see e.g., 
KAIMING LIU, BIANYUAN REN [The Marginalised People] English title: 
Migrant Labor in  South China (2003); DOROTHY SOLINGER, CONTESTING 
CITIZENSHIP IN URBAN CHINA: PEASANT MIGRANTS, THE STATE, AND THE 
LOGIC OF THE MARKET (1999); COMPA, supra note 31, at 44 -55. Individual 
accounts by women migrant workers telling of their poor conditions are 
regularly collected and published on the website of the Chinese Working 
Women’s Network: <www.cwwn.org>. 
26
Estimates of migrant workers vary widely, but they number well 
in excess of 100 million.41 They provide the mass workforce 
necessary to carry out low skilled tasks in the innumerable factories 
(female migrant workers) and construction sites (male migrant 
workers) in China’s more prosperous cities and towns. Migrant 
workers are frequently young and have poor training and career 
prospects. They are often in poor health42 and remain dependent on 
their home communities for social security support.43 There is an 
entrenched view among firm managers that it is acceptable to 
41 According to a Chinese National Bureau of Statistics report, there were 113.9 
million workers from rural China in 2003. 69.9% of these traveled to Eastern 
provinces and 47.3% were under 25. Migrant Workers Number 113.9 Million 
in 2003, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, May 15, 2004.
42 See e.g., the 2001 survey of 1,043 workers by Chinese Working Women 
Network, 'The Health Survey Report of Migrant Women Workers' (Chinese 
Working Women Network, 2001). 37% of respondents experienced fainting 
spells.
43 LIU, supra note 40, at 12–13. 
27
accord migrant workers worse treatment.44 On the other hand, in 
comparison with migrant workers, the local residents are generally 
much better educated, much better connected politically and 
economically, and much more likely to occupy a skilled or 
managerial position in, or indeed to own, enterprises employing 
rural workers.45
The distinction between urban and rural workers has been 
institutionalized by the household registration or hukou system, 
which has specified for every Chinese citizen their place of 
residence and classified them as either agricultural or non-
44 See e.g., the survey of managerial attitudes towards migrants in 118 
enterprises in four major Chinese cities: John Knight et al., Chinese Rural 
Migrants in Urban Enterprises: Three Perspectives, 35(3) JOURNAL OF 
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 73, Table 13 (1999). The most significant reason 
given for recruiting migrant workers is that they can ‘bear hardship': 60% of 
respondents. 
45 SALLY SARGENSON, REWORKING CHINA'S PROLETARIAT 67 (1999).
28
agricultural (or urban).46 Unskilled rural workers migrating to 
Chinese cities have not generally been able to acquire urban 
residency status, even if they remain for long periods in cities. 
Their ‘agricultural’ status has prevented them from accessing urban 
benefits and support services,47 and most importantly in the 
workplace context, representation by official trade unions.48
Internal migration rules governing hukou are now being gradually 
dismantled, with eleven provinces (including Guangdong)  moving 
46
 On the origins and evolution of the hukou system, see Tiejun Cheng & Mark 
Selden, The Origins and Social Consequences of China’s Hukou System, 139 
THE CHINA QUARTERLY 644 (1994); Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhang, The 
Hukou System and Rural-urban Migration: Processes and Changes, 160 THE 
CHINA QUARTERLY 818 (1999). The effects of the hukou residency system are 
examined extensively in LIU, supra, note 40; on its effect on labor conditions, 
see especially at 139–67, 209–44.  
47 Id. at 832.
48 See infra notes 349-352 and accompanying text.
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toward their abolition.49  It is difficult to track the extent of the 
dismantling process or to determine its effects. The hukou rules are 
expressed in diverse administrative instruments at national and 
local level, much of it for internal bureaucratic use only.50 Reforms 
have so far been tentative and localized. If they take root generally, 
the pervasive discrimination against migrant workers may ease. For 
the moment, though, migrant workers continue to suffer seriously 
from the effects of the hukou system.
Notwithstanding the hukou system, urban and rural workers are 
entitled to the equal benefit of the protections of the Labor Law;: 
the Law draws no formal distinction in the application of key 
norms on the basis of hukou. In particular, both are entitled to be 
paid for work performed and both are entitled to reasonable hours 
49 See Fei-ling Wang, Reformed Migration Control and New Targeted People: 
China's hukou System in the 2000s, 177 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 115 (2004); 
China Rethinks Peasant 'Apartheid' , BBC NEWS WEBSITE, November 15th, 
2005. 
50
 Wang, supra note 49, at 115-117. 
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of work. Thus, while the hukou system might explain in part why 
there is widespread discrimination against migrant workers, it does 
not excuse contravention of the Labor Law.
III. NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF LABOR LAW: FACTORS 
INTERNAL TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Clearly, violations of core labor law principles are rife in China: 
millions of workers are not paid their due wages for their labor 
and/or are required to work hours injurious to health. While no 
legal system can entirely eradicate these abuses, we may well ask 
why the law does not do more to reduce their prevalence. This Part 
explores the facets of formal Chinese labor regulation that blunt 
and confuse its capacity to speak authoritatively to workplaces.
China’s legal system has been recreated in less than thirty years 
from the wreckage of the Cultural Revolution.51 Little wonder then 
51
 For comprehensive accounts of the Chinese legal system, see RANDALL 
PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW (2002); 
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that it is fragile and inchoate. Interrelated internal shortcomings are 
the state of legal rules; flaws in the bureaucratic modes of 
enforcement; weakness in legal dispute institutions and the lack of 
independent civil society organizations that can invoke the law on 
behalf of individuals. While these shortcomings are characteristic 
of the legal system as a whole, they also manifest themselves in the 
specific context of labor relations.
A  THE STATE OF LEGAL RULES
1  The General Legal System
Since the late 1970s, there has been a profusion of rule making in 
China as the country attempts to create a legal infrastructure for a 
society undergoing extraordinary transformation. Legal discourse 
STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO
(1999); on implementation issues see also NEIL DIAMANT ET AL., ENGAGING 
THE LAW IN CHINA: STATE, SOCIETY, AND POSSIBILITIES FOR JUSTICE (2005); 
JIANFU CHEN ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN CHINA - AN INTRODUCTION
(2002).  
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has come to permeate the major areas of state activity.52 This 
legislative activity has been impressive. Nonetheless, until very 
recently, law making has not been subject to a detailed overarching 
framework53 As Peerenboom writes:
52
 For an extensive analysis of this process in relation to the methods of 
maintaining social order, see Sarah Biddulph,  The Legal Field of Policing in 
China: Administrative Detention and Legal Reform (2004) (unpublished 
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Melbourne) (on file with the University of 
Melbourne Library).
53
 The Constitution sets out the roles of governmental organs, but only in very 
general terms. Major steps forward in systematizing the legal order have been 
taken with the passage of the Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa [Law of 
the People’s Republic on China on Legislation] (hereafter  Legislation Law), 
passed by the National People’s Congress on March 15, 2000, with effect 
from July 1, 2000; the Xingzheng Fagui Zhiding Chengxu Tiaoli
[Regulations on the Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative 
Regulations], promulgated by the State Council on November 16, 2001 with 
effect from January 1, 2002 and the Guizhang Zhiding Chengzu Tiaoli
[Regulations on the Procedures for the Formulation of Rules], promulgated 
by the State Council on the same date.  
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A number of entities have been afforded the right to 
legislate, which has resulted in a bewildering array of laws, 
regulations, provisions, measures, directives, notices, 
decisions, explanations, and so forth, all claiming to be 
normatively binding and treated so by the creating entity.54
Legal rules are produced by, in hierarchical order,55 the National 
People’s Congress and its Standing Committee (enacting falü or 
‘laws’56); the State Council (promulgating xingzheng fagui or 
‘administrative regulations’),57 people’s congresses at the 
provincial and equivalent levels (enacting difangxing fagui or ‘local 
54 PEERENBOOM, supra note 51, at 241. 
55 See in particular, Legislation Law, arts. 78-83.
56 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa [Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China] (hereafter PRC Constitution) passed by the National 
People’s Congress December 4, 1982 (since amended four times) arts. 62 and 
67 and Legislation Law, Chapter 2. 
57 See PRC Constitution, art. 89; Legislation Law, Chapter 3.
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regulations’);58 and a large number of bodies including provincial 
governments, government ministries and commissions (issuing 
rules generically described as guizhang,59 but having a wide range 
of titles). Below this point in the hierarchy sit ‘normative 
documents’ (guifanxing wenjian) issued by governmental bodies; 
such documents include rules on the border of law, policy and 
interpretation. 
The legal materials produced by these governmental bodies suffer 
from a variety of weaknesses.60 First, many legal instruments, 
including major laws, are overly vague, to the extent of containing 
very significant omissions (including reference to other non-
existent instruments). They also confer broad discretions on 
implementing agencies.61 A ‘bare bones’ approach to statute 
making is not inherently unworkable; indeed it is characteristic of 
58 See PRC Constitution, art. 100; Legislation Law, Chapter 4, Section 1.  
59 See arts. 90, 107 PRC Constitution; Legislation Law Chapter 4, Section 2.
60 See e.g., PEERENBOOM, supra note 51; Biddulph, supra note 52, at 183-190. 
61 PEERENBOOM, supra note 51, at 247-253.
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many civil law jurisdictions. However, in contrast to societies 
where statutes sit alongside long standing complementary 
processes of subordinate rule-making and judicial interpretation, 
the elaboration of China’s key statutes is frequently either 
insufficient or confusing.
Second, some legal rules, especially lower-level rules, are 
unavailable to the public, either because they are intended for 
internal use only, or because the promulgating agency has failed to 
publish them properly.62 Although legislation now requires most 
forms of legal rules to be gazetted in the relevant official 
publication and reproduced in newspapers,63 this does not extend 
to normative documents. This problem is compounded by the fact 
that legal rules change very frequently; indeed many are introduced 
on a temporary or provisional basis only.64
62 Id. at 245-247.
63
 Legislation Law, arts. 66, 70, 77.
64 PEERENBOOM, supra note 51, at 253-255.
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Third, rules are often inconsistent with each other. This may be 
because, for example, lower level rules have not been amended 
despite the passage of inconsistent superior legislation, or because 
different agencies attempt to regulate the same matter, or because a 
superior law has proved unworkable and interim measures are 
needed.65
Fourth, Chinese courts do not have general authority to interpret 
rules, to resolve conflicts between rules, or to declare rules invalid, 
although they may refuse to enforce rules in a specific case if they 
are inconsistent with higher level laws.66 Generally speaking, the 
power to interpret laws is vested in the body that formulated 
65 Id. at 256-259.
66 Id. at 316-318, 420-424. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong 
Fa [Administrative Litigation Law of the People's Republic of 
China](hereafter Administrative Litigation Law), passed April 4 1989 with 
effect from October 1, 1990, arts. 12(2), 52-53.
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them,67 although this power is partially delegated to the Supreme 
People’s Court, which frequently issues interpretations of law.68
The power to invalidate rules which conflict with superior 
instruments or with other rules of similar status lies with bodies 
exercising legislative or executive, rather than judicial power, such 
as the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and 
67
 The power to interpret laws is vested in the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress, Legislation Law arts. 42-47. Administrative 
Regulations are interpreted by the State Council: Regulations on the 
Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative Regulations, supra note 53, 
art. 31; Other rules are likewise interpreted by the formulating agency: 
Regulations on the Procedures for the Formulation of Rules, supra note 53, 
art. 33. These provisions stipulate that interpretations have the same legal 
effect as the original instrument.  
68
 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu Shenli Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Shiyong Falü 
Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi [Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court 
Concerning Several Issues Regarding the Application of Law to the Trial of 
Labor Disputes Cases] (hereafter Labor Dispute Interpretation) (Fashi 2001 
No14), issued by the Supreme People’s Court April 16, 2001 with effect from 
April 30, 2001. See also PEERENBOOM, supra note 51, at 317-318.
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the State Council.69 Citizens are able to petition the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress to invalidate a rule 
that is contrary to the Constitution or a Law.70 However, this is not 
very effective as the Standing Committee rarely invalidates rules.71
Further, only governmental organs are able to request 
interpretations or rules, not individual citizens.72 The overriding 
impression this system leaves is that the processes for clarifying the 
effect of rules are predominantly geared toward the internal 
ordering of state agencies. This is of course important, but it 
renders individual citizens seeking to ascertain the effect of legal 
rules dependent on the bureaucracy.
69
 Legislation Law, arts. 85-88. 
70
 Legislation Law, art. 90. 
71 PEERENBOOM, supra note 51, at 259. Citizens are also able to request the 
State Council and other organs address conflicts between certain rules: 
Regulations on the Procedures for the Formulation of Rules art. 35. 
72
 Legislation Law, art. 43; Regulations on the Procedures for the Formulation 
of Administrative Regulations, art. 32; Regulations on the Procedures for the 
Formulation of Rules, art. 33.  
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In short, it can be very difficult to ascertain what one’s legal 
rights and obligations are. It should be emphasized that this 
situation does not reflect the determination of a unified party-state 
to stymie the legal system. On the contrary, it reflects compromises 
and battles between and within organs at different levels of policy-
making; tensions may be based on conflicting ideology, 
bureaucratic self-interest, local-national friction, and so on.73
Indeed, there are many people at all levels of government 
attempting to provide greater order in the legal system. Real 
progress is illustrated by the enactment of the Legislation Law and 
complementary State Council regulations.74 These instruments set 
out a hierarchical ranking of legal instruments, establish clear 
processes for rule-making and interpretation, place limits on lower-
level regulation making, and require publication of legislative 
instruments. However, it may take many years before these 
73 See for example, the detailed analysis of the process of legal reform of 
administrative detention conducted by Biddulph, supra note 52. 
74 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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principles are entrenched, especially in lower-level and regional 
agencies. 
2  Labor Law
Consider now how these system-wide problems manifest 
themselves in the context of labor regulation.75 At first glance, 
China appears to have built up a relatively comprehensive and 
logically ordered framework of labor regulation. The Labor Law of 
1994 establishes a contract-based system of employment 
regulation76 based on ‘voluntary’ and ‘equal’ negotiation, and 
replaces the former communist system based on administrative 
allocation.77 The Law goes on to stipulate a number of minimum 
standards with which employment arrangements must comply. 
75
 See also VIRGINIA HO, LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR LABOR RIGHTS AND LEGAL REFORM  (2003), 196-200.
76
 Labor Law, art. 17
77 See generally, HILARY JOSEPHS, LABOR LAW IN CHINA 41-48 (2003); RONALD 
KEITH & ZHIQIU LIN, LAW AND JUSTICE IN CHINA'S NEW MARKETPLACE 93-
127 (2001).
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These include the principles of non-discrimination78 and equal 
work for equal pay,79 a prohibition on child labor,80 protection 
against arbitrary dismissal,81 and a minimum wage.82 The Law 
also contains provisions on collective contracts,83 vocational 
training84 and social insurance benefits.85 Most relevantly for the 
purposes of this article, the Law prohibits unjustified arrears and 
excessive working hours.86 Additional major laws, in particularly 
the Trade Union Law of 1992 (extensively revised in 2001)87 and 
the Law on Work Safety of 2002)88 complement these provisions.
78
 Labor Law arts. 12-14.  
79 Id, art. 46.
80 Id. arts. 15, 64.
81 Id. arts. 23-32.
82 Id. arts. 48-49.
83 Id. arts. 33-35.  
84 Id. arts. 66-69. 
85 Id. arts. 71-76.
86 See infra Part III.A.4.
87
  Trade Union Law, supra note 15.
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The Labor Law is a major legislative achievement. However, on 
closer examination, the Law has serious limitations. It provides 
only the skeleton of a regulatory framework, with its articles either 
supplemented by subordinate legal instruments (which number in 
the thousands)89 produced by various state agencies, or left 
unelaborated.
This point can be illustrated by considering the rules pertaining to 
the two labor abuses we are examining: wage arrears and excess 
working hours. In both cases, we see that bright line rules rendering 
88
 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Anquan Shengchan Fa  [Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Work Safety] (hereafter Work Safety Law) passed by 
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress June 29, 2002 
with effect from November 1, 2002. 
89
 As of March 2005, there were some nine hundred and sixty such instruments 
listed on the Ministry of Labor and Social Security website: 
<http://www.molss.gov.cn:8080/trsweb_gov/mainframe.htm>. These do not 
include many provincial and local rules.
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both these abuses unlawful become more complex and attenuated 
the more supplementary regulatory material is considered.
3  Underpayment of Wages
Looking firstly at wages, article 50 of the Law stipulates that:
Wages shall be paid monthly to workers in person in the 
form of cash. Wages shall not be misappropriated (kekou) 
nor shall the employer fall in arrears (tuoqian) without 
justification.
Provisions complementary to article 50 require parties to the 
employment relationship to abide by their contractual 
commitments90 (which must at least include payment at the level of 
the minimum wage).91
90
 Labor Law, arts. 17 and 48.
91
 Minimum wages are set at the provincial government or equivalent level and 
are supposed to be adjusted at least once every two years: Labor Law arts. 48 
and 49; Zuidi Gongzi Guiding [Regulations on the Minimum Wage], 
promulgated on January 20, 2004 with effect from January 1, 2004, arts 7, 
10. These Regulations set out a detailed formula to be followed in setting 
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While these provisions appear to generate straightforward 
obligations to pay wages, they are very vague. They do not define 
wages. They do not spell out how they can be varied. They do not 
provide for wage records to be kept and given to employees. They 
do not explain what forms of labor service generate an entitlement 
to wages; for example, what happens if there is no work to be 
performed or an employee is sick or must perform a public duty. 
They do not explain how to deal with a situation where an 
employer-employee relationship is obscured by a network of 
contractual arrangements. They do not clarify what 
‘misappropriation’92 or ‘delay without justification’ means; 
whether, for example, an employer is permitted to deduct wages for 
losses allegedly sustained as a result of employee breach, or to pay 
minimum wages, with the wage set at approximately 40 to 60% of the 
average monthly wage in the relevant area: see id. Attachment: Method of 
Calculation of the Minimum Wage. 
92 kekou means to withhold money for personal gain.
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training expenses, or whether temporary economic difficulties 
might count as ‘justification’.
One great difficulty here is that the Chinese legal system creates a 
radical separation between employment contracts and other types 
of contractual relationships.93 This sharp delineation is apparently 
made for ideological reasons; it preserves in legal form the 
ideological position that Chinese workers are not commodified.94
93
 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetong Fa [Contract Law of the People's 
Republic of China], passed by the National People’s Congress March 15, 
1999 with effect from October 1, 1999. art. 123 of the Contract Law provides 
that ‘where other laws stipulate otherwise on contracts, such provisions shall 
govern.’ Art 124 provides that ‘for contracts not explicitly regulated by the 
Specific Provisions of this Law or other laws, the General Provisions of this 
Law shall apply, and the most similar provisions in the Specific Provisions of 
this Law or other laws may concurrently be used as reference.’ [emphasis 
added]. Note that the Contract Law does regulate contracts for services (i.e. 
independent contractor arrangements): Chapter 15. 
94
 See HUAI GUAN, LAODONG FAXUE (Labor Law) 215 (5th ed, 2001); for a 
critique see KEITH & LIN, supra note 77, at 110-111; see further JOSEPHS, 
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In any case, as the national contract law does not apply to 
employment contracts, there is no contractual substratum such as 
that which underpins employment contracts in common law or 
other major civil law systems. It is thus a legal error to draw on 
general contractual principles to determine the legal rules 
applicable to, for example, central issues in wage disputes such as 
when, how, by whom and to whom wages must be paid; the 
circumstances in which non-payment may be justified; and, where 
wages are not paid in accordance with law, how compensation is to 
be determined. 
This means that the Labor Law and related legislation ought to 
spell out comprehensively the major principles relating to labor
contracting. However, while the Law does deal with individual 
labor contracts, its specific treatment is limited to only twenty-one 
supra note 77, at 28-30 (commenting on the ideological debates in the lead-
up to the introduction of the contract system).
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articles,95 ten of which solely concern termination.96 The Law is 
silent on matters such as agency, variation, capacity, implication of 
terms, good faith, the effect of work performed under an invalid 
contract, transfer of business, and the principles for determining 
compensation for breach.97 Although there are proposals for a labor
95
 Labor Law, arts. 16-32, 97-99, 102. These brief articles concern the 
negotiation of labor contracts (art. 17), invalidity (arts. 18, 97), mandatory 
content (art. 19), duration (arts. 20-21), business secrets (art. 22), termination 
(arts. 23-32), administrative punishments and compensation for breach by 
employer or employee (arts. 98 and 102), and inducing breach of contract 
(art. 99).  By way of contrast, the general provisions of the Contract Law 
consist of 129 articles, which are supplemented by further provisions dealing 
with specific types of contracts.
96
 Labor Law, arts. 23-32.
97
 By contrast, most of these matters are generally dealt with in the Contract 
Law. Although strictly speaking Chinese courts do not have authority to make 
law, the Supreme People’s Court has provided some clarification of the 
consequences of breach of employment contracts: Labor Disputes 
Interpretation, supra note 68, arts. 14 and 15.
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contract law and/or a comprehensive law on wages,98 these laws 
are yet to be adopted at the national level.
The lacunae in the regulatory framework are filled to some extent 
by subordinate legal instruments, such as the Temporary 
Regulations on the Payment of Wages99 issued by the Ministry of 
98
 I am aware from conversations with Chinese labor law scholars that drafts of 
such laws are being discussed. See also Gerard Greenfield & Tim Pringle, 
The Challenge of Wage Arrears in China, in PAYING ATTENTION TO WAGES 30
(Manuel Simon Velasco ed., 2002).
99 See e.g., Gongzi Zhifu Zanxing Guiding [Temporary Regulation on the 
Payment of Wages], promulgated by the Ministry of Labor on December 6, 
1994 with effect from January 1, 1995; Weifan he Jiechu Laodong Hetong de 
Jingji Buchong Banfa [Measures on Economic Compensation for Violation 
and Termination of Labor Contracts], promulgated by the Ministry of Labor 
on December 3, 1994 with effect from January 1, 1995 (stipulating the rate of 
compensation to be paid for termination, non-payment, underpayment or 
delay in payment of wages); see also discussions in JINGSEN LI & JUNLING 
JIA, LAODONG FAXUE [Labor Law] 68-83 (2004); GUAN, supra note 94, at 
210-233. The Ministry of Labor is now the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security (MOLSS).
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Labor. However, these instruments are attended by the difficulties 
outlined above. Let us track through how these instruments 
elaborate at the national level the key terms ‘misappropriation’ and 
‘fall into arrears without justification’ in Article 50, and in 
particular how they deal with the very common practice of 
retaining a bond. 
The subordinate rules are mainly concerned with what does not
constitute misappropriation and delay. First, the Temporary 
Regulations on the Payment of Wages address the question of 
misappropriation. They permit an employer to make deductions for 
tax and social security purposes, and in accordance with an 
employment contract, as compensation for economic loss caused 
by the employee.100 Further Supplementary Regulations issued by 
100
 Temporary Regulation on the Payment of Wages, supra note 99, art. 16. The 
amount deducted per month may not exceed 20% of the employee’s monthly 
wages, nor may the employee be paid less than the minimum wage. See LI & 
JIA, supra note 99, at 198; JIAN GUO ET AL, LAODONG FAXUE [Labor Law]
189 (2001); GUAN, supra note 94, at 292.
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the Ministry extend the range of circumstances that do not 
constitute ‘misappropriation’ to include deductions authorized by 
work rules approved by workers’ congresses101 and reductions in 
accordance with performance pay schemes, provided remuneration 
does not fall below the minimum wage.102 The Supplementary 
Regulations also indicate that arrears in payment are justified 
where they result from a natural disaster and from a firm’s 
economic difficulty where authorized by the union (but only up to a 
maximum period specified by the local province).103 It is not until 
we come to low-level instruments,104 a 1995 Opinion issued by the 
101
 On the nature and declining effectiveness of workers’ congresses, which are 
formal structures for staff participation in firm decision-making, see TAYLOR 
ET AL, supra note 25, at 138-143. 
102
 Dui “Gongzi Zhifu Zhanxing Guiding” youguan Wenti de Buchong Guiding
[Supplementary Regulation on Questions concerning the Temporary 
Regulation on the Payment of Wages] promulgated by the Ministry of Labor 
on December 5, 1995 with immediate effect, cl 3. 
103 Id. cl 4. Of course, this is problematic if provinces fail to specify a maximum 
time limit. 
104
 These appear to fall into the category of ‘normative documents’.
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Ministry of Labor,105 and two Notices issued jointly by the 
Ministry, the Ministry of Public Security and the All China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) that we find explicit 
statements that employers are not permitted to require employees to 
furnish any kind of bond or security. The Notice directed at the 
private sector106 provides:
An enterprise must not collect currency, or other objects as 
‘security upon entering the factory’ (ruchang diya), and 
105
 Laodong Bu guanyu Guanche Zhixing Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Laodongfa Ruogan Wenti de Yijian [Ministry of Labor Opinion on Certain 
Questions concerning the Implementation of the Labor Law of the PRC] 
(hereafter 1995 Opinion), issued August 4, 1995, cl 24. On the question of 
delay, cl 64 of the Opinion refers the reader to four other ‘notices’ or 
‘regulations’ dealing with economic difficulties in state-owned enterprises. 
106
 Guanyu Jiaqiang Waishang Tuozi Qiye he Siying Qiye Laodong Guanli 
Qieshi Baozhang Zhigong Hefa Quanyi de Tongzhi [Notice concerning 
Strengthening the Real Protection of Workers’ Lawful Rights and Interests in 
Foreign Invested and Private Enterprises], issued by the Ministry of Labor, 
the Ministry of Public Security and the All China Federation of Trade Unions 
on March 4, 1994. 
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must not detain an employee’s identity card or temporary 
resident card, or hold them as security. If any enterprise 
without authorization details or holds as security a worker’s 
residency card, the Ministry of Public Security and the 
Labor Department Inspectorate must order it to immediately 
return it to the worker in person.107
So, after much searching, we find that while deductions and 
arrears are permissible in a variety of circumstances, these do not 
include the practice of retaining a bond. It is clear from this 
exercise that the important rules governing underpayment of wages 
are not readily ascertainable by those who wish to assert their 
rights. Indeed, one of the most significant rules - that against taking 
bonds - is buried in low-level notices. Furthermore, while the 
instruments themselves seem to be publicly available from the 
MOLSS website (although this is not always up to date), 
107 Id. cl. 2.
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availability is quite different from accessibility. The scattered 
location of the applicable rules defies easy retrieval.108
4  Working Hours
The second example illustrating the limitations of the labor law 
framework concerns working hours.109 The key principles seem 
straightforward and reflective of the ‘standard’ twentieth century 
regulatory approaches to working hours.110 On paper, they appear 
to ensure that employees do not work excessive hours. The Labor
Law provides for an eight-hour day, and an average working week 
108 HO, supra note 75, at 194-196.
109 GUO ET AL, supra note 100, at 149-161.
110These are reflected in ILO Conventions, especially Hours of Work (Industry) 
Convention (ILO No 1), November 28, 1919 (entered into force 13th June 
1921). Newer regulatory approaches are emerging, especially in the European 
Union: see Deidre McCann, Regulating Working Time Needs and 
Preferences, in WORKING TIME AND WORKERS' PREFERENCES IN 
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 10 (Jon Messenger ed., 2004).
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of 44 hours.111 Workers are entitled to at least one day off per 
week112 to public holidays,113 and, if they have over one year’s 
service, to paid leave.114
The Law also regulates overtime; generally this is limited to one 
hour per day.115 However, an extension of the working day by up 
to three hours is permitted for ‘special reasons’ (teshu yuanyin) on 
the conditions that workers’ health is protected and that the total 
monthly extension is no more than 36 hours.116 Any extension to 
working hours is subject to consultation with the unions and the 
workers concerned.117 Extensions of working hours in violation of 
111
 Labor Law, art. 36. Firms using piece rates must adapt their quotas and 
remuneration to this system: art. 37.
112 Id. art 38.
113 Id. art 40.
114 Id. art 45.
115 Id. art. 41.
116 Id.
117 Id.
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the law are expressly prohibited.118 Penalty rates apply to overtime 
work (150%), to work arranged on leave days (200%) and to work 
on public holidays (300%).119
This concise framework is, however, significantly modified both 
by the Law itself and by other legal instruments; these render the 
standards both more and less stringent. 
As to making the standards more stringent, within months of the 
Law entering into effect, the State Council promulgated a short 
regulation stipulating ordinary working hours as forty (not forty-
four) hours per week.120 This created some confusion, since the 
118 Id. arts. 43, 90. 
119 Id. art. 44.
120
 Guowuyuan guanyu Zhigong Gonzuo Shijian de Guiding [State Council 
Regulation concerning Working Hours], promulgated by the State Council 
March 25, 1995, in effect from May 1, 1995, art. 3. This change was made 
apparently because it was believed that China was sufficiently advanced to 
permit lower working hours: (LI & JIA, supra note 99, at 111). This 
conclusion appears to have been premature. 
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State Council’s regulation prescribed no penalties for failure to 
comply. The Labor Ministry (as it then was), having authority to 
interpret the State Council regulation,121 subsequently indicated 
that a firm operating between forty and forty-four hours per week 
could be ordered to ‘make corrections’ (gaizheng) but did not 
indicate whether such a firm could be fined.122
Still, whether the working week is forty or forty-four hours, it 
seems plain that the long ‘peak season’ working periods described 
above are manifestly unlawful. At most, employees could be 
required to work for no more than nine eleven hours days per 
month, and roughly 48 hours per week (on a forty hour base) or 52 
121
 State Council Regulation concerning Working Hours, supra note 120, art. 8.
122
 This clarification, issued in 1997, was in response to a request from the 
Guangzhou Labor Bureau: Guanyu Zhigong Gongzuo Shijian youguan Wenti 
de Fuhan [Reply concerning Working Hours], issued by the Ministry of 
Labor on September 10, 1997.
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hours per week (on a forty-four hour base).123 These hours would 
attract significant overtime payments. 
However, the Law opens the door to allowing broad departures 
from the standards just stated. The two relevant provisions are 
articles 39 and 42. Article 39 provides that where, owing to the 
‘special nature of production’ (yin shengchan tedian), an employee 
cannot follow the stipulations on the forty-four hour week and the 
one day of leave per week, it may, with the approval of the 
administrative department of labor, adopt other rules on working 
hours and rest (described below as ‘non-standard working hours 
systems’). Article 42 provides that working hours may be extended 
beyond the limits described in other articles in the event of an 
emergency threatening the health of workers or the safety of 
property, where urgent repairs are needed to production facilities 
and in ‘other circumstances stipulated by laws and administrative 
rules’ (falü, xingzheng fagui guiding de qita qingxing). 
123
 These are based on various combinations of a forty, or forty-four, hour week 
and thirty-six hours overtime.
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Both these provisions leave a large amount of discretion to 
administrative agencies to devise their own rules on working hours. 
This has been done both at the national level by the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Security (MOLSS) and locally by provincial and 
municipal labor departments. The MOLSS rules on non-standard 
working hours systems124 refer to two separate schemes of non-
standard working hours: irregular hours and ‘accumulated hours’ 
(including annualized hours). Irregular hours schemes would seem 
to involve the complete exclusion of the Labor Law’s standards.125
Accumulated hours schemes permit employers to calculate hours 
on a weekly, monthly, seasonal or annualized basis in which only 
124
 Guanyu Qiye Shixing Buding Shigong Zhi he Zonghe Jisuan Gongshi 
Gongzuo de Shenpi Banfa [Measures concerning the Approval of the 
Implementation in Enterprises of Systems of Non-standard Working Hours 
and of Accumulated Working Hours] (hereafter Working Hours Measures), 
promulgated by the Ministry of Labor on December 14, 1994, with effect 
from January 1, 1995, art. 4.
125 Id. art. 4.
59
the average (pingjun) working day and working week must be 
‘basically similar’ (jiben xiangtong) to the standards in the Law.126
The MOLSS rules specify the categories of work to which these 
schemes may apply and the use of catchall phrases permits broad 
application of the opt-out provisions. Such phrases include 
‘workers who, because of special nature of production, the special 
requirements of work, or the scope of job responsibilities, are 
suitable for non-standard working hours’, ‘other workers whose 
work cannot be measured in standard hours’127 and ‘other 
employees for whom accumulated hours schemes are suitable’.128
It is essentially up to the local labor bureaus to determine whether 
employer proposed schemes should be approved. The MOLSS 
rules stipulate the considerations that bureaus are to take into 
account in approving the schemes only in general terms: they must 
126 Id. art 5. Note that such systems can be used to reduce overtime payments. 
127 Id. art. 4(1), (3) (in relation to irregular hours schemes).
128 Id. art 5.
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ensure that employers protect employees’ health, listen to their 
opinions and protect their right to rest and leave – while also 
ensuring the completion of production tasks.129 Some local labor
bureaus have issued rules tightening the circumstances in which 
these opt-out schemes can be used. Thus, in the Beijing area, 
irregular hours schemes cannot be used for production workers,130
and both non-standard hours schemes must be devised through 
consultation with the firm’s union, workers’ congress or with the 
workers directly131 and may be approved for a maximum of three 
129 Id. art 6.
130
 Beijingshi Qiye Shishi Zonghe Jisuan Gongshi Gongzuozhi he Buding Shi 
Gongzuozhi de Banfa [Beijing Municipality Measures on Enterprise 
Implementation of Systems of Accumulated Hours of Work and Non-
Standard Working Hours], issued by Beijing Labor Department December 9, 
2003 with effect from January 1, 2004, art. 11(5).
131 Id. art. 14. The application form in the Beijing area requires the inclusion of 
union or workers’ congress comments.
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years.132 Other municipalities such as Shanghai and Shenzhen have 
not been so prescriptive.133
While a person with legal expertise might be able to develop an 
accurate understanding of the law in this area, many 
businesspeople, workers and local government officials are likely 
to struggle to determine the precise state of the law on working 
hours. Moreover, many workers risk seeing their entitlements to 
reasonable working hours eviscerated by bureaucrats partial to 
employer perspectives.
5  ‘Non-Standard Workers’
In addition to the shortcomings specific to remuneration and 
working hours, there is further limitation that underlies the 
132 Id. art. 16. 
133
 Compare, for example, the Shenzhen Jingji Tequ Laowugong Tiaoli
[Regulation of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on Migrant Workers], 
as amended by the Standing Committee of the Shenzhen Municipal People’s 
Congress, February 13 1998. 
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framework regulating labor law as a whole. As mentioned earlier, 
the Law creates a radical separation between employment contracts 
and other types of contractual relationships.134 This separation fails 
to recognize one of the dominant challenges for contemporary 
labor regulation. Increasingly, work relationships are no longer 
typified by the putative subject of traditional135 employment 
regulation: long-term employees engaged by a clearly identifiable 
employer. Around the world, as a result of technological changes in 
production processes, ever more elaborate and unstable global 
supply chains, employer strategies and many other factors, work in 
many countries is being increasingly performed by part-time or 
casual workers (very often female), or is being contracted out to 
firms with few or no regular workers.136 The traditional boundary 
134 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
135
 I am referring to the mode of employment regulation that characterized 
much of the last century.
136 See e.g., KATHERINE W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT 
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004); MANUEL CASTELLS, 
THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY (1996).
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between an employee and an ‘independent contractor’, 
fundamental to the conceptual structure of labor law, has become 
very blurred. This global trend is mirrored in China. As the vestiges 
of the command economy disappear, and global supply chains 
anchor their labor intensive manufacturing in a vast network of 
Chinese firms, new forms of work arrangements are proliferating, 
many of them short-term and precarious.137
Many societies have sought to adapt their regulatory framework 
in response to these changes in work arrangements, so as to avoid 
seeing increasing numbers of people working outside that 
framework. However, China’s labor law and labor institutions very 
much persist with the traditional approach and the complete legal 
uncoupling of labor contracting from general contracting 
accentuates this. While the Labor Law is broad in terms of the 
types of enterprise it covers,138 it applies only to certain categories 
of workers, namely to ‘workers (laodongzhe) who form a labor
137 See Gallagher, supra note 36, at 21-26.
138 GUAN, supra note 94, at 148-149. 
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relationship (laodong guanxi) with enterprises…’139 This phrase 
sets the boundary between those workers to whom the Labor Law 
standards apply and those whose work relations are governed by 
the general contract law. However, the phrase is quite vague; it is 
not apparent how it should be applied to work relationships that 
could either be categorized as employer-employee or as two 
independent contractors. Such relationships include homeworkers 
(or outworkers) in the textile industry or individual trades people in 
the construction industry.
A second boundary question concerns the situation in which it is 
a worker is clearly an employee but it is difficult to identify who 
the employer is. Such a problem arises where workers are 
transferred between firms, when firms merge or divide, or in long-
term labor hire arrangements. Again, we need to look to 
subordinate and local legislation to address this question and 
139
 Labor Law, art. 2. 
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nowhere is it dealt with comprehensively.140 For example, while 
the MOLSS’s 1995 Opinion on the Labor Law seeks to delineate 
the category of workers to which the Law applies, it does so by 
listing certain exclusions.141 It does not address the ‘boundary’ 
question.142
Guidance on how to decide whether a person is a worker for the 
purposes of the Law is crucial. Not only will it indicate whether 
labor standards apply to that person, it will also determine whether 
140
 This issue is dealt with in some of the provincial level contract regulations: 
see e.g., Shanghai Shi Laodong Hetong Tiaoli [Shanghai Municipality Labor 
Contract Regulations], passed by Shanghai Municipality People’s Congress, 
November 15, 2001, with effect from May 1, 2002, arts. 24 and 25.
141
 1995 Opinion, supra note 105, art. 3. This states that the Labor Law does not 
apply to ‘government functionaries (gongwuyuan), agricultural laborers 
(nongcun laodongzhe, not including workers in town and village enterprises, 
or who work in cities), military personnel and domestic servants (jiating 
baomu).
142
 Nor do major textbooks, see e.g., GUAN, supra note 94; LI & JIA, supra note 
99; GUO ET AL, supra note 100.
66
the labor bureau and the labor disputes arbitration committees have 
jurisdiction, and whether the person is eligible to be a union 
member. 
To be sure, it is not only in China that legal concepts, including 
those pertaining to the employment relationship, evolve in a piece-
meal fashion. The Chinese can scarcely be criticized because the 
elaboration process has had to be compressed into a few years 
rather than centuries as in Western legal systems. What is 
distinctively problematic about the Chinese mode of elaboration, 
however, is that the pursuit of detail takes an inquirer ever further 
away from laws directed at the general public to often temporary 
legal instruments primarily designed for and directed at state 
agencies.143 The people informed about the legal position are the 
labor bureaucracy rather than, at least in the first instance, 
employers, employees, or the courts.
143
 Thus, labor regulation is frequently addressed to labor bureaus in the various 
provinces and relevant ministries.
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Many legal experts in China are alert to the deficiencies of the 
labor law framework: one important response is that a Labor
Contract Law is currently being drafted nationally.144 This may 
make it much easier for employers and employees to determine 
their rights and obligations in relation to the payment of wages, and 
indeed for bureaucrats to understand what rules they must 
implement. Several provincial level congresses have already 
enacted their own local regulations on labor contracts145 and/or 
wages.146 While these different initiatives lead to further 
144 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
145 E.g. Shanghai Shi Laodong Hetong Tiaoli [Shanghai Municipality Labor 
Contract Regulations], passed by Shanghai Municipality People’s Congress, 
November, 15 2001, with effect from May 1, 2002; Beijing Shi Laodong 
Hetong Guiding [Beijing Municipality Labor Contract Regulations], issued 
by the Beijing Labor Bureau with effect from February 1, 2002. 
146 See e.g., Shanghai shi Qiye Gongzi Zhifu Banfa [Shanghai Municipality 
Enterprise Wage Payment Measures], issued by the Shanghai Labor and 
Social Security Department with effect from April 1, 2003; Guangdong sheng 
Gongzi Zhifu Tiaoli [Guangdong Province Regulations on the Payment of 
Wages], promulgated by the Standing Committee of the Guangdong 
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fragmentation and inconsistency, they may provide models for law 
at the national level. One promising attempt to create a 
comprehensive and comprehensible framework, responding not 
only to the need to specify clear norms but also to problems with 
enforcement, is examined at the end of this Part.
B  ENFORCING THE RULES: BUREAUCRATIC 
IMPLEMENTATION
Notwithstanding the difficulties in identifying exactly what the 
relevant legal norms are, many of the more extreme instances of 
withholding wages and requiring long working hours (especially 
where no departure from the standard hours systems has been 
authorized) can be safely characterized as unlawful. The 
widespread nature of these abuses suggests that the means of 
securing compliance with the law have severe shortcomings. There 
are three main, interrelated, state vehicles for implementing labor
law: enforcement by state agencies, dispute resolution processes 
Provincial People’s Congress on February 19, 2005 with effect from May 1, 
2005. 
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and monitoring by the official trade union organization.147 The 
function and structure of each body is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Function and Structure of Key Implementation Bodies
Relevant 
function
Base level ‘Vertical’ 
relationships148
‘Horizontal’ 
relationships
Labor
Department 
Inspectorates
Enforce labor
laws
Local 
departmental 
offices
Subordinate to
MOLSS
Subordinate to 
local People’s 
Government and 
People’s Congress
Labor Dispute 
Arbitration 
Committees 
(LDACs)
Mediate and 
arbitrate labor
disputes
Attached to 
local labor
departments
Subordinate to 
MOLSS
Subordinate to 
local People’s 
Government and 
People’s Congress
People’s 
Courts
Hear appeals 
from LDACs;
Enforce 
arbitrated 
awards and 
court orders
Basic
People’s 
Courts
Court 
hierarchy 
culminating in 
Supreme 
People’s Court
Resourced and 
appointed by local 
People’s 
Government and 
People’s Congress 
Trade Unions Supervise 
implementation 
of labor laws 
Enterprise 
union
Subordinate to 
union 
federations on 
Union officials 
often closely 
linked or identical 
147
 On the formal processes for enforcement of the labor law, see generally, 
GUAN, supra note 94, at 553-577.
148
 On the significance of ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ relationships, see infra note 
200 and accompanying text.
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and compliance 
with labor
contracts
geographic 
and industry 
basis and to 
peak body 
(ACFTU) 
to enterprise 
management 
and/or party 
organization
This and the two following sectors examine these institutions in 
more detail, commencing with labor departments.
In China, the burden for ensuring that labor laws are enforced is 
placed even more heavily on administrative agencies than it is in 
many other countries. Most labor law norms (as with very many 
legal rules in China) take the form of ‘command and control’ 
regulation.149 Legal instruments state rules, charge an agency with 
149
 The particular emphasis on command and control in China is in part a legacy 
of a legal tradition in which law has been long viewed as a tool of state policy 
rather than as a source of rights: Zhiping Liang, Explicating Law: a 
Comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western Legal Culture, 3 JOURNAL 
OF CHINESE LAW 55 (1989); LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN EAST ASIA: 
THE RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 
1999); Pitman Potter, Riding the Tiger: Legitimacy and Legal Culture in 
Post-Mao China, 138 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 325 (1994).
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implementing them and then set out a range of sanctions that that 
agency or another state agency can impose if the rules are
violated.150
The main institutions responsible for implementing labor law are 
the ‘labor administration departments established under people’s 
governments above county level’ (xianji yishang geji renmin 
zhengfu laodong xingzheng bumen).151 These local labor
departments,152 which operate both under the MOLSS and under 
150 See e.g., ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC 
THEORY 4, 245-256 (1994). 
151
 Labor Law, art. 85. See also Laodong Baozhang Jiancha Tiaoli [Regulations 
on Labor Protection Inspection] (hereafter Labor Inspection Regulations), 
promulgated by the State Council on October 26, 2004, with effect from 
December 1, 2004. See LI & JIA, supra note 99, at 206-207: GUAN, supra
note 94, at 543-548. 
152
 Although these are now formally labor and social security departments, I 
will use the briefer term ‘labor department’ .
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their local provincial or municipal government,153 have jurisdiction 
in relation to most aspects of labor law within their area, with the 
important exception of occupational health and safety.154 The 
Labor Law requires labor departments to ‘supervise and inspect’ 
(jinxing jiandu jiancha) employer compliance with labor
153
 Each province, together with the autonomous regions and the four 
municipalities of provincial status (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Chongqing), has its own labor and social security ting (provincial 
department) or ju (bureau or office). Below these are branch offices attached 
to significant cities, or (in the case of Beijing and Shanghai) parts of major 
cities. Many of these in turn have sub-branch offices. For a listing of labor 
and social security departments and offices at provincial and regional levels, 
see <http://www.lm.gov.cn/links/links-bztj.htm>.
154
 Labor Inspection Regulations, art. 35. In 1998, responsibility for workplace 
safety was transferred from the Ministry of Labor to the State Administration 
of Work Safety (Guojia Anquan Shengchan Jiandu Guanli Zongju, SAWS) 
and its sister agency, the State Administration of Coal Mine Safety. At the 
same time, responsibility for occupational illness was transferred to the 
Ministry of Health.  These agencies have their own provincial and local level 
departments separate from the MOLSS:  Work Safety Law art. 9, and 
Occupational Health Law art. 8..  
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regulation.155 They do so through inspectorates established in the 
principle provincial/municipal departmental offices and in local 
branch and sub-branch offices.
The precise responsibilities, procedural rules and enforcement 
powers of labor inspectors were until very recently governed 
mainly by a complex set of rules promulgated at various times by 
the MOLSS156 as well as by other governmental organs at the 
provincial and municipal level. Fortunately, the State Council’s 
2004 Labor Inspection Regulations have authoritatively updated 
and consolidated these rules.157
The Labor Inspection Regulations, elaborated in supplementary 
rules promulgated by the MOLSS,158 establish a clear process for 
155
 Labor Law art. 85. 
156
 MOLSS had promulgated at least 8 separate instruments. 
157 Supra note 151.
158
 Guanyu Shishi Laodong Baozhang Jiancha Tiaoli  Ruogan Guiding [Certain 
Provisions concerning Implementation of the Regulations on Labor 
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dealing with allegations that the labor law has been violated. Any 
person159 or organization may report a violation of the law to their 
local labor department, and any worker whose rights or interests 
have been violated by an employer may lodge a complaint within 
two years of becoming aware of the violation.160 These include 
complaints about unpaid wages and excessive overtime, and indeed 
in at least some areas, these are the most common complaints.161 A 
labor department must respond to the complaint within 5 working 
days either by accepting it, asking for further information, referring 
Protection Inspection](hereafter Labor Inspection Implementing Provisions) 
issued by the MOLSS on January 24, 2005 with effect from February 1, 
2005.
159
 A group of persons may jointly lodge a complaint, and appoint a 
representative: id. art. 12.
160
 Labor Inspection Regulations, arts. 9, 20.
161
 Isabelle Thireau & Linshan Hua, One Law, Two Interpretations: Mobilizing 
the Labor Law in Arbitration Committees and in Letters and Visits Offices, in 
ENGAGING THE LAW IN CHINA: STATE, SOCIETY AND POSSIBILITIES FOR 
JUSTICE 91 (Neil Diamant et al. eds., 2005). 
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the complainant to the correct jurisdiction162 or advising the 
complainant that the claim is unacceptable.163
If the complaint is accepted, departmental officers must 
investigate it; they may exercise wide powers to enter premises, 
interview people, engage accountants, collect data and preserve 
162
 If cases fall within the jurisdiction of another agency, they must be sent to it, 
and if the labor department suspects that criminal conduct is involved, the 
case must be referred to the Procuratorate:  Labor Inspection Regulations art. 
18. Cases that have already been dealt with by the labor dispute procedures 
are not subject to further investigation by the labor department: id. art. 21.
163 Id. art. 14. Labor Inspection Implementing Provisions, art. 18. Some matters 
involving payment of compensation to employees for loss arising from 
unlawful conduct (such as payment arising from an invalid contract) must be 
referred to labor dispute resolution procedures: Labor Inspection Regulations 
art. 21; Labor Inspection Implementing Provisions arts. 15-16. 
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evidence.164 Cases must be completed within a maximum of 90 
days from commencement.165
If they find that breaches of the legislation and rules have 
occurred, the local labor departments can exercise a range of 
powers. They can order a firm to cease a wrongful act and ‘make 
corrections’ (zeling gaizheng)166 within a specified time period,167
164
 Labor Law art. 86; Labor Inspection Regulations art. 15; Labor Inspection 
Implementing Provisions art. 26-29. 
165
 Labor Inspection Regulations art. 17. 
166
 Labor Law arts. 85 (general power to stop and rectify illegal acts); 89 (work 
rules not in accordance with the law); 90 (working hours unlawfully 
extended); 92 (breach of occupational health and safety requirements); 94 
(illegal recruitment of minors); 95 (violation of special protection provisions 
for women and minors); 98 (wrongful termination of, or delay in execution 
of, employment contracts). 
167
 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Chufa Fa [Administrative 
Punishments Law of the PRC], passed by the National People’s Congress 17th
March 1996 with effect from October 1, 1996, art. 23; Laodong Xingzheng 
Chufa Ruogan Guiding [Certain Regulations on Administrative Punishments 
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and order a firm to provide compensation for harm caused.168 They 
can also impose an administrative penalty (or sanction, chufa). The 
administrative punishments are warnings (jinggao), fines (fakuan), 
confiscation of unlawful earnings (moshou weifa suode), orders to 
cease business operations (zeling tingchan tingye) and revocation 
of a permit (diaoxiao xukezheng).169 An additional sanction 
with respect to Labor], promulgated September 27, 1996 with effect from 
October 1, 1996, art. 6.
168
 Labor Law art. 91 (arrears, embezzlement, non-payment of overtime, 
payment below the minimum wage, and non-payment of termination 
entitlements). A firm is liable for compensation to employees in many other 
instances, although there is no explicit power for the labor department to 
direct it to pay: arts. 89 (work rules not in accordance with law), 95 (violation 
of special protection provisions for women and minors); 97 (labor contract 
invalid through fault of the employer); 98 (wrongful termination of, or delay 
in execution of employment contracts).
169 Laodong Xingzheng Chufa Ruogan Guiding [Certain Regulations concerning 
Administrative Punishments with respect to Labor], promulgated by the 
Ministry of Labor on 27th September, 1996 with effect from 1st October, 1996 
art. 5). Fines can be imposed under the following provisions of the Labor 
Law: arts 90 (working hours unlawfully extended), 92 (breach of 
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provided for serious violations is publication of the conduct to 
society at large.170 Criminal conduct should be referred to the 
procuratorate.171
The scope of these penalties, and the principles governing their 
imposition, are not spelt out in the Labor Law but in the Labor
Inspection Regulations and subordinate legal instruments produced 
by the MOLSS. These clarify the amount of compensation that can 
be ordered, the various punishments for breaches of the labor law 
occupational health and safety requirements), 94 (illegal recruitment of 
minors), 95 (violation of special protection provisions for women and 
minors), 100 (failure to pay social insurance premiums), 101 (obstructing 
departmental officers or retaliating against informants). 
170
 Labor Inspection Regulations, art 22. 
171
 Labor Inspection Implementing Provisions, art. 35. For a discussion on the 
merits of criminal procedures for serious occupational health and safety 
breaches, see John Balzano Criminal Liability for Labor Safety Violations in 
the People's Republic of China, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUDIES L. REV. 503 
(2004). 
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and the procedures for imposing those punishments.172 In cases of 
underpayment of wages (including payment below the minimum 
wage) and non-payment of overtime, labor officials can order a 
firm to pay the worker the full amount owed within a specified 
time, and, if the firm fails to comply, order it to pay an additional 
50% to 100% of the outstanding amount.173 Where employers 
unlawfully extend working hours, departmental officers may warn 
the employer to comply with the law, order the employer to comply 
and/or impose a fine of between 100 and 500 Yuan per worker.174
172
 In relation to procedural requirements, see Labor Inspection Implementing 
Provisions Chapter 5. These reflect the requirements of the Administrative 
Punishments Law of the PRC, supra note 167.
173
 Labor Inspection Regulations, art. 26. This expands on art. 91 of the Labor 
Law. The Minimum Wage Regulations stipulate that an employer can be 
ordered to pay compensation of up to five times the amount in arrears: supra
note 91, art. 13. 
174
 Labor Inspection Regulations, art 25. This corresponds to art. 90 of the 
Labor Law. 
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If the employer refuses to comply with departmental orders, the 
fine escalates to between 2,000 and 20,000 Yuan.175
The analysis so far suggests that Chinese labor departments have 
the authority and powers necessary to force employers to observe 
the law. However, there are many factors blunting their potential 
effectiveness. 
Firstly, the disorderly state of legal rules means that local 
agencies may give greater weight to rules or policies devised by 
themselves or related agencies than to higher legal instruments, 
which formally have greater authority. Although greater 
consistency is being achieved, there is, as we have seen, still scope 
for inconsistency.
Secondly, and more significantly, the sanctions that labor 
departments can themselves deploy against egregious violators are 
actually quite weak. Firms clearly orient their actions not simply on 
175
 Labor Inspection Regulations, art. 30.
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the basis of legality but, even more so, in accordance with cost-
benefit calculations. Sanctions need to be sufficiently powerful to 
overcome incentives not to comply with the law. These incentives 
are extremely strong in many Chinese firms. They face constant 
pressure to lower their labor costs by illegal means, such as through 
breaching labor contracts or compelling unreasonable hours. 
Evasion of labor law by some firms creates immense pressure on 
those others who might initially have a stronger disposition to abide 
by the law. This cascade effect is well illustrated in China’s export-
oriented manufacturing sector. If a firm in that hypercompetitive 
environment is struggling to meet its supply deadlines, knows that 
its rivals will require staff to work unreasonable hours, and knows 
that they are very unlikely to be punished, it faces a choice between 
adhering to the law and survival.176 Most firms are likely to choose 
survival over a steadfast but suicidal commitment to the law. To be 
sure, the imposition of codes of conduct on subcontractors by 
enterprises at the top of global commodity chains, and other private 
176 LIU & TAN, supra note 34, at 83–5.
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sector initiatives, creates a counterweight of sorts to these 
incentives to evade the law, but evidence to date suggests that this 
has not yet proved particularly effective.177
Firms using low-skilled migrant labor have been especially prone 
to violate the law because their workers have, at least until recently,
been unable to use labor market pressures to compel the employer 
to act lawfully. Threats to exit the firm unless the law is obeyed
have carried little weight because of China’s huge labor surplus,178
although recent unskilled labor shortages in certain cities may 
177
 As I have pointed out previously, it would seem that until there is a 
fundamental change in the practice of MNEs, most factories in the sweatshop 
industries will be awarded supply chain contracts on the basis of price, 
quality and efficiency, not compliance with corporate social responsibility 
initiatives: Sean Cooney, A Broader Role for the Commonwealth in 
Eradicating Foreign Sweatshops?, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 290, (2004), at. 318.
178
 According to official estimates, there are 150 million surplus rural workers, 
in addition to the more than 100 million migrant rural workers: Migrant 
Workers Number 113.0 million in 2003, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, May 15, 
2004.
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indicate that many rural workers have at last decided that the poor 
working conditions are unacceptable.179 Further, as discussed 
below, industrial action to force compliance has no legal status or 
protection and union officials (who are often also managers and/or 
party officials) discourage it.180
In these circumstances, the economic incentives for non-
compliance with the law need to be countered by credible legal 
sanctions. These are generally not available to labor departments.
Where employers fail to heed formal warnings, or refuse to obey 
correction orders, labor departments in most instances are limited 
to imposing fines and compensation orders. The usefulness of these 
measures is attenuated by the labor department’s reliance on 
179 See e.g., Brian Ho, Is there a Migrant Labor Shortage in China? CSR ASIA 
WEEKLY VOL 2 (8) (2006). These include claims that Guangdong Province 
has a labor shortage of up to 1 million workers. The shortfall is partly 
attributed to the poor wages and conditions in the areas experiencing the 
shortfall and there is some evidence that market pressures are leading to 
improvements in wages and conditions: id.
180 See infra notes 324 and accompanying text.
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judicial compulsory execution procedures to force unwilling firms 
to pay.181
Consider their capacity to apply the following serious sanctions 
available to many Chinese governmental agencies: cessation of 
business, confiscation of earnings, revocation of license, 
administrative detention of an employer and prosecution. With one 
exception (revocation of a license to use non-standard working 
hours systems),182 it would seem that the labor departments would 
not be able to generally deploy these sanctions against cases of 
underpayment of wages and unhealthy working hours. Under 
nationally applicable regulations, explicit power to order business 
181
 Labor Inspection Implementing Provisions, art. 44.      
182
 As we have seen, the law permits enterprises to establish non-standard 
working hours systems, but these require permission of the labor department: 
Labor Law art. 39; Working Hours Measures, supra note 124, arts. 4 and 5. 
Neither of these measures explicitly enables the labor departments to revoke 
such permits.  However, MOLSS departments have a general power to 
suspend licenses: Certain Regulations on Administrative Punishments with 
respect to Labor, supra note 167, art 5. 
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operations to cease or to confiscate earnings is given to the labor
departments only in relation to job placement and training 
agencies.183
The restriction on sanctions available to labor departments is 
partly a consequence of important administrative reforms directed 
at preventing bureaucratic agencies from arbitrarily inflicting a 
wide range of punishments on individuals. Viewed from an 
administrative law perspective, the restrictions seem appropriate in 
a system where arbitrary action has been notorious. On the other 
hand, an unfortunate by-product of these reforms in the labor
context is limiting the scope of credible threats that can be made to 
183
 Labor Inspection Regulations art. 28. Further, labor departments cannot 
exercise the power to detain employers: Administrative Punishments Law art. 
9. That power can be invoked where an employer’s failure to comply with the 
labor department constitutes an offence against public order but it must be 
exercised by the public security agencies: Labor Inspection Regulations art. 
30. See also Labor Law art. 96, which applies where employers beat, 
intimidate or detail workers. Labor departments are also unable to initiate 
criminal prosecutions, as this is a matter for the procuratorate: id.
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a recalcitrant employer. Relatively effective enforcement strategies 
often involve the ability to ‘escalate’ interventions.184
The Labor Law does set out circumstances (mostly connected 
with health and safety) in which a firm may be shut down or 
earnings confiscated by other authorities, such as the Department of 
Industry and Commerce, the State Administration of Work Safety 
or the Ministry of Health.185 Labor departments can therefore refer 
serious cases to, or seek the assistance of, those other agencies. 
However, this renders the enforcement process much more 
184 See infra note 408 and accompanying text.
185 See e.g., Labor Law art. 92 (People’s Government can order a firm to close 
down for work safety breaches) and art. 94 (Department of Industry and 
Commerce can close firm for employing minors). Administrative detention 
and criminal prosecutions are among the available sanctions for various 
offences under the Work Safety Law, supra note 88, Chapter 6. Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Zhiyebing Yuzhi Fa [Law of the People's Republic of 
China on the Prevention and Cure of Occupational Diseases], passed by the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, promulgated October 
27, 2001, entered into effect May 1, 2002.
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complex, as labor department officials need to secure the co-
operation of the agencies, and thereby lose control of the 
enforcement process. The other agencies may well have different 
internal priorities, lack expertise in labor matters, and/or be 
unwilling to devote resources to labor enforcement issues. Further, 
there may also be jurisdictional disputes in which agencies either 
seek to intervene differently over the same issue or seek to pass the 
buck to each other. For example, as we have seen, working hours is 
an issue managed chiefly by labor departments but it can also be 
constructed as a question of workplace safety and health; these are 
matters that fall within the responsibility of the State 
Administration for Workplace Safety and the Ministry of Health, 
both of which have greater coercive powers.
Third, while, as we have also seen, employees individually and 
collectively are entitled to lodge complaints with labor
departments, it is difficult for them to compel a department to
pursue a case where it is unwilling to devote resources to it. 
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Labor inspectors have considerable discretion to dismiss 
complaints if they consider them trivial or already remedied, or 
cannot substantiate them.186 They can also do so if the complaint is 
made more than two years after the violation, if the employees are 
unable to identify the correct employer (which may be difficult in 
the context of complex supply chains) or if labor department 
considers the matter is outside its jurisdiction.187
The steady improvements in administrative law mean that 
employees can seek both administrative and judicial review of a 
decision not to pursue a labor complaint. Administrative review 
(xingzheng fuyi) extends to review of both the lawfulness and 
appropriateness of matters pertaining to remuneration and hours of 
work.188 Review can either be sought from the local labor
186
 Labor Inspection Implementing Provisions art. 35.
187 Id. art. 18.
188
 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Fuyi Fa [Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Administrative Review] passed by the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress and promulgated on April 29, 
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department concerned or – more usefully – the labor department at 
the next higher level in the administrative hierarchy.189 Judicial 
review of administrative action, or administrative litigation 
(xingzheng susong) against a labor department is also possible 
where the department has failed to perform its duty under the labor
law to protect employee rights or has failed to respond to a 
complaint.190
1999 with effect from October 1, 1999. This Law is reflected in the Laodong 
he Shehui Baozhang Xingzheng Fuyi Banfa [Measures on Administrative 
Reconsideration with respect to Labor and Social Security], promulgated by 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Security on November 23, 1999, with effect 
from that date; see in particular arts. 1, 3(6).
189 Id. art. 6.
190
 The Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 66, enables a citizen to 
commence court proceedings where an agency has ‘refused to perform its 
statutory duty’: art. 11(5) and a court can require an agency to perform its 
duty within a stipulated time period: art. 54 (3).  
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Unfortunately, administrative review and administrative litigation 
are neither well-used to secure compliance with a statutory duty191
nor particularly effective.192 Administrative review is hampered by 
the unwillingness of agencies to accept complaints and to correct 
improper decisions, often as a result of local political or economic 
pressures, and lack of proper procedures. Administrative litigation 
is restricted by the inability of the courts to invalidate 
administrative rules, and by the generally conservative approach 
taken by courts to the scope of their review powers. Both processes 
are impeded by lack of public knowledge about, or fear of, legal 
191
 There was a total of 75,918 applications for administrative review in 2003: 
Zhongguo Falü Nianjian [China Legal Yearbook] 2004, 1071-1073. Only  3% 
of all cases (not just labor cases) related to failure to perform a statutory 
function (2,210 in the entire country) and in only 1% (659 cases) was an 
order made to perform a function: id. at 1072. These statistics also show that 
there were 44, 587 cases of administrative litigation in 2003.. Less than 2% 
of these cases (659) concerned failure to perform a statutory function and 
only 135 cases resulted in an order to perform.  
192 See e.g., Biddulph, supra note 52, at 226-256 (focusing on review of 
policing decisions); PEERENBOOM supra note 51, at 399-424.
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procedures, compounded by failure of agencies to inform citizens 
of their remedies (despite being legally obliged to do so).193
Moreover, in so far as administrative law reforms have some use, 
it is employers rather than employees who are best placed to take 
advantage of them. Unscrupulous employers may invoke them to 
stall and dissuade labor departments from implementing the law. 
Thus, where a labor department proposes to order a firm to cease 
operations, or revoke a license, or impose a large fine, it must, at its 
own expense, arrange for a hearing in which the parties enjoy 
extensive procedural rights, including a right to representation.194
Administrative penalties can be challenged either through 
193 PEERENBOOM, supra note 51, at 418.
194
 Laodong Xingzheng Chufa Tingzheng Chengyu Guiding [Regulation on 
Hearing Procedures for Administrative Punishments with respect to Labor], 
promulgated by the Ministry of Labor on September 27, 1996 with effect 
from October 1, 1996. ‘Large fines’ (jiao da shu fakuan) are not defined in 
this instrument. However, it would not include a fine of 1,000 yuan or less, in 
respect of which ‘on the spot’ procedures can be used: id. arts. 33-34.
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administrative review or administrative litigation;195 failure to 
comply with procedures even in less serious cases can lead to 
invalidation of the penalty,196 an obligation to compensate the 
firm197 and/or sanctions being imposed on labor department 
officers rather than the firm.198 It is understandable that 
inexperienced departmental officers, lacking legal qualifications
and often lacking resources, may be reluctant to challenge an 
employer prepared to exhaust its legal options. 
195
.Almost half of all applications for administrative review related to 
admin istrative punishments: Zhongguo Falü Nianjian [China Legal 
Yearbook] 2004, 1072
196
 Administrative Punishments Law, supra note 167, arts. 6 and 35. Note that 
the penalty is not suspended pending review and litigation: id art. 45; Labor 
Inspection Implementing Provisions, art. 42.
197 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Peichang Fa [Law of the 
People's Republic of China on State Compensation] (passed by the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress on May 12, 1994, with effect 
from January 1, 1995.
198 Id. art. 44.
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Fourth, corruption and local protectionism can set the prevailing 
agenda for the bureaucracy.199 In accordance with Chinese 
administrative practice,200 local labor departments have ‘two 
masters’: they are subordinate both to higher level units of their 
ministry (the MOLSS) (the vertical or tiao relationship)201 and to 
the provincial congress and government of the area in which they 
operate (the horizontal or kuai relationship). Since labor
departments are staffed and funded by local governments, it is often 
these that have the upper hand in directing the day-to-day work of 
199
 Feng Ye, The Chinese Procuratorate and the Anti-corruption Campaigns in 
the People's Republic of China, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 117-8 (Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 2002); Andrew 
Wederman, The Intensification of Corruption in China, 180 THE CHINA 
QUARTERLY 895 (2004).
200
 Benjamin van Rooij, China's System of Public Administration, in
IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 323, 329-331, 
341-2 (Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 2002).
201
 Labor Inspection Regulations, supra note 151, art. 7. 
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departmental officers.202 Local governments often have close links 
to businesses under scrutiny or indeed manage those businesses.203
Admittedly, complainants are able to request that labor inspectors 
handling their case be replaced if they face a conflict of interest but 
the decision is an internal matter for the department.204
Fifth, the quality and quantity of labor inspectors may well be 
inadequate to implement the law systematically across the 
202
 Benjamin van Rooij, Implementing Chinese Environmental Law through 
Enforcement, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 164-8 (Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 2002), at 330.
203 TAYLOR ET AL, supra note 25, at 43-45. Taylor at al comment that expansion 
of private businesses is a mark of a local government’s success, providing 
that social stability is maintained at a minimum level and no serious unrest 
occurs: id. at 44; SARGENSON, supra note 45, at 39-41. Compare Van Rooij, 
supra note 202, at 162-163. 
204
 Labor Inspection Implementing Provisions arts. 23-25. This decision could 
presumably be subject to administrative review or litigation. 
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country.205 As to quality, the qualifications for labor inspectors are 
minimal; the only substantive requirement is that an inspector must 
have engaged in labor administrative work for at least three years 
and must have undertaken a training program.206 As to quantity, 
while there are more than 3,000 inspecting agencies and 40,000 
labor inspectors,207 this number is dwarfed by the number of 
business entities in China – around 30 million.208
205
 Compare also van Rooij’s analysis of environmental protection officers, 
supra note 202.
206
 Laodong Jianchayuan GuanliBanfa [Measures on the Management of Labor 
Inspectors], issued by the Ministry of Labor November 14, 1994 with effect 
from January 1, 1995, art. 7. Inspectors must undergo a re-qualification 
examination procedure every three years: id. art 12.  
207
 Zhongguo Falü Nianjian [Law Yearbook of China] 2003 at 45. These figures 
are from 2001; the exact number of agencies reported in that year is 3174. 
The 2004 Yearbook does not contain updated figures.
208 See KANAMORI, supra note 25, at 24. More than 90% of these are privately 
operated in one form or another: id. Not all of these enterprises are employers 
– the statistics do not indicate which proportion of firms has employees. 
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Finally, despite the potential sanctions for so doing, firms adopt 
extensive strategies to frustrate inspection work. For example, in 
the event that bribes do not succeed, many firms keep false records 
and coach workers so that when an external inspection into 
working hours and other conditions takes place, the inspectors are 
deceived.209
C  ENFORCING THE RULES: DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
PROCEDURES
The shortcomings in bureaucratic enforcement render it all the 
more important for workers to be able to enforce their rights 
through formal dispute resolution processes.210 This form of 
enforcement process enables workers to be directly engaged in 
209 LIU & TAN, supra note 34, at 76-79; CHAN, supra note 2, at 123-125.
210
 Two excellent studies on this topic are HO, supra note, 75 (in English), and 
SHANGYUAN ZHENG, LAODONG ZHENGYI CHULI CHENGXUFA DE 
XIANDAIHUA [The Modernisation of Labor Adjustment Procedure Law] (in 
Chinese).
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seeking compliance. When a complaint is referred to a labor
department, workers lose control of it, in the sense that as we have 
seen labor departments cannot be readily compelled to act in 
workers’ interests. On the other hand, dispute resolution procedures 
constitute workers as parties, with the ability to structure the claim 
and pursue the issue to conclusion.
The centerpiece of the Chinese labor dispute resolution process is 
labor arbitration. According to the Labor Law, all formal disputes 
that cannot be resolved by mediation within an enterprise211 should 
be channeled through arbitration. Arbitration is an essential 
precondition, not an alternative, to litigation.212 A worker cannot 
211
 Intra-firm mediation is rapidly declining as an effective mode of dispute 
resolution, especially in private firms: Mary Gallagher, '"Use the Law as Your 
Weapon" Institutional Change and Legal Mobilization in China' in  
ENGAGING THE LAW IN CHINA: STATE, SOCIETY AND POSSIBILITIES FOR 
JUSTICE (Neil Diamant, Stanley Lubman and Kevin O'Brien eds, 2005) at 
67-70; Hualing Fu & D.W. Choy, From Mediation to Adjudication; Settling 
Labor Disputes in China, 3 CHINA RIGHTS FORUM 17, 18 (2004). 
212
 Labor Law art.  83. 
98
directly file suit in a court, even for a claim for unpaid wages (a 
simple debt) without first going through arbitration.213
Labor arbitration operates as follows. Where a labor dispute first 
occurs, a worker or an employer may apply for mediation within 
the enterprise.214 If mediation fails or if one of the parties is 
unwilling to have the dispute mediated, one or both of the parties 
may apply for labor arbitration.215 Labor arbitrations (which 
usually often involve their own mediation phase)216 are conducted 
213 GUAN, supra note 94, at 531; ZHENG, supra note 210 at 146-149. Zheng 
regards this precondition as an incursion into a citizen’s right to litigate.  
214
 Labor Law art. 79. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Laodong Zhengyi 
Chuli Tiaoli [Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Settlement of 
Labor Disputes in Enterprises], promulgated by the State Council on July 6, 
1993, entered into effect August 1, 1993 [hereafter Dispute Regulations], art. 
6. 
215
 Labor Law art. 79; Dispute Regulations art. 6.
216
 The proportion of cases settled by LDAC mediation has been in steep 
decline; less than 30% of cases were resolved by mediation in 2002: Fu & 
Choy, supra note 211, at 19.
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by tripartite labor dispute arbitration committees (laodong zhengyi 
zhongcai weiyuanhui, ‘LDAC’s), established by the local labor
departments.217
The LDACs (of which there are close to 3,000)218 have, on 
paper, very wide jurisdiction. This extends to disputes over wages 
by present and former employees and to disputes over working 
hours.219 The LDACs also have broad powers to rule on the 
217
 Labor Law arts. 81; Dispute Regulations art. 12. Individual cases are heard 
by arbitration tribunals (zhongcaiting) consisting of individual arbitrators or, 
in more complicated cases, three arbitrators. A major case may be referred to 
the entire committee for determination: Dispute Regulations art. 16. LDAC 
Rules art. 21 
218
 There were 2,934 in 2003 according to the Zhongguo Falü Nianjian [Law 
Yearbook of China] 2004, at 603.
219
 Labor disputes are broadly defined to cover a range of matters in connection 
with an employment relationship.  The scope of a labor dispute is set out in 
the Dispute Regulations. Art. 2 provides that the term ‘labor disputes’ 
includes disputes between enterprises and employees in China in relation to 
(1) terminations, lay-offs and resignations; (2) wages, insurance, welfare, 
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validity of a contract, order reinstatement of a terminated 
employee, order the payment of compensation and/or require 
employers to comply with labor contracts.220
More and more labor disputes are being brought before 
LDACs.221 According to statistics from the MOLSS,222 the 
training and labor protection (including hours); (3) the performance of labor 
contracts; and (4) other disputes as defined in other laws or regulations.  The 
labor dispute procedure applies to disputes where a labor relationship has 
existed, notwithstanding that no contract has been concluded: art.1, Supreme 
People’s Court Interpretation on Labor Disputes, supra note 68.  See also 
HO, supra note 75 at 77-78 (noting that disputes involving  independent 
contractor and analogous arrangements fall outside the purview of the 
procedures). 
220
 The powers are not specifically set out in the Labor Law or in the Dispute 
Regulations but are implicit in the LDAC’s ability to resolve disputes through 
arbitration within its jurisdiction. On the kinds of orders that LDACs make, 
see JOSEPHS, supra note 77, at 90-95.  
221 For a comprehensive analysis of labor dispute occurrence and types, see Ho, 
supra note 75 at 82-143. See also Gallagher, supra note 211; Thireau & Hua, 
supra note 161. 
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number of new cases has been rising yearly, from 47, 951 in 1996 
to 226,391 in 2003, an increase of more than 470% in just seven 
years.223 The vast majority of these cases are filed by employees 
rather than employers.224 The number of workers involved has also 
jumped from less than two hundred thousand to more than eight 
hundred thousand.225 In 2003, more than 60% of cases concerned 
disputes in the private sector.226 Further, more than one third of all 
222
 Not entirely reliable (figures do not always tally with each other), although 
they probably do indicate general trends.
223
 Zhongguo Laodong Tongji Nianjian [Yearbook of Labor Statistics] 2004 
Table 9-1. The number of collective disputes has risen from 3150 in 1996 to 
10823 in 2003, an increase of 340%.   
224 Id. 215,512 or 95%.
225 Id. In 1996, there were 189,120 workers involved. This increased more than 
420% to 801,042 in 2003.
226 Id. Table 9-2. In 2003, there were 141,465 cases in various forms of non-
state enterprise, 48,771 in state-owned enterprises and 30,218 in collectively-
owned enterprises. Of the 801, 042 workers involved in labor dispute cases in 
2003, 416, 472, or 52% were from the state sector. See Gallagher, supra note 
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labor arbitrations concern remuneration.227 MOLSS figures show 
that just under half of cases in 2003 proceeded to arbitration, the 
remainder being settled either by mediation or ‘other means’ (qita 
fangshi).228 In any case, MOLSS asserts that almost all matters 
(92%) were resolved within a year,229 that around half of the 
matters were resolved solely in the employee’s favor and that in 
35% of cases both parties were partly successful.230
These statistics suggest that, from an employee perspective, 
LDACs are operating very effectively. Yet something is seriously 
awry. Although the statistics are inconsistent, it would seem that a 
211, at 63-65 on why there seem to be proportionately fewer disputes brought 
from state-owned enterprises.
227
 Zhongguo Laodong Tongji Nianjian [Yearbook of Labor Statistics] 2004 
Table 9-2. 76.774 cases in 2003 (34%); of which 65% were in the non-state 
sector. 
228 Id. 95, 772 or 42% went to arbitration.
229 Id. Only 19,164 of the cases were not settled by the end of 2003.
230 Id. 109,556 cases were won (shangsu) by employees, 34,272 by employers 
and in 79, 475 cases both parties won (shuangfang bufen shangsu). 
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majority of cases are appealed from arbitration.231 One reason for 
this appears to be that many LDACs reject cases because of an 
excessively narrow view of their jurisdiction – perhaps to lower 
their workload by shifting cases to the courts – but the courts then 
take them up.232 Another is that a very high proportion of arbitral 
judgments are appealed.233 A third reason is that litigants are 
seeking to have arbitral awards enforced by the courts.234
231 HO, supra  note 75 at 79. Some data suggests that statistics report that the 
number of labor disputes taken to the courts actually exceeds that taken to 
arbitration, which is impossible. According to the Zhongguo Falü Nianjian
[Law Yearbook of China] 2004, at 125, there were almost one hundred 
thousand labor disputes litigated in 2003.
232
 Gallagher, supra note 211, at 62; Thireau & Hua, supra note 161, at 87. Note 
that this practice is conflict with Supreme People’s Court Interpretation on 
Labor Disputes art. 1: see supra note 68. 
233
 Gallagher reports officials in Beijing and Shanghai indicating that in 2003, 
nearly 70% of all judgments were appealed, supra note 211, at 73.
234 Id. at 74.
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The high rate of court applications suggests that Chinese labor
arbitration has serious weaknesses. This impression is confirmed by 
the comprehensive critique of the system by Chinese labor law 
scholar, Zheng Shang-yuan.235 Professor Zheng firstly observes 
that the present labor dispute resolution processes were conceived 
in the era when the economy was much more centrally planned and 
dominated by the state sector than it is today. They remain highly 
bureaucratized (xingzhenghua), with the labor departments as the 
central actors.236 The LDACs, while formally separate entities 
which are authorized to ‘settle labor disputes independently 
according to law’,237 are chaired by a labor department 
representative,238 located within the labor dispute settlement 
235 ZHENG, supra note 210.
236 Id. 137-141. 
237
 Art. 2 of the Laodong Zhengyi Zhongcai Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Guize [Organic 
Rules of Labor Dispute Arbitration Committees] (hereafter LDAC Rules), 
promulgated by the Ministry of Labor, November 5, 1993 with immediate 
effect.
238
 Labor Law art. 81; Dispute Regulations art. 13.
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section of the department,239 and dependent on the department for 
administrative work.240 Moreover, the LDACs do not have the 
status of legal persons, do not have their own assets or control over 
their financial operations, and cannot pay the wages and benefits of 
their members. This means in effect that the full-time arbitrators 
must be employees of the labor departments.241 This position may 
be contrasted with that of commercial arbitration bodies.242
239
 Dispute Regulations art. 13.
240 Id. LDAC Rules art. 3.
241 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 154. LDAC Rules art. 15. However, LDACs can 
charge arbitration fees: Dispute Regulations art. 34. The LDAC Rules 
provide that LDAC operating costs are to be met through arbitration fees and 
‘financial supplements’: art. 24. This article also provides that LDACs are to 
have separate funds for their own use; in view of Professor Zheng’s 
comments, it is not clear that this occurs in practice. 
242 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongcai Fa [Arbitration Law of the 
People's Republic of China](hereafter Arbitration Law), passed by the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, August 31, 1994, 
with effect from September 1, 1995. Art 8 provides that ‘arbitration shall be 
carried out independently according to law and shall be free from interference 
106
Further, although LDACs are ostensibly based on the principle of 
tripartism and should be comprised of state, employer and 
employee representatives, in practice state representatives 
dominate.243 We have just seen that the labor department 
representative is the chair of a LDAC. The ‘employer’ 
representative is nominated by government agencies responsible 
for administrating state owned enterprises;244 this means that 
despite the growing private sector of the economy, there is no 
engagement in the dispute resolution process by private employers. 
On the other hand, the ‘employee’ representative is drawn from the 
quasi-governmental official trade union organization.245 In any 
of administrative organs, social organizations or individuals.’ Art 14 provides 
that ‘arbitration commissions shall be independent from administrative
organs and there shall be no subordinate relationships between arbitration 
commissions and administrative organs.’ 
243 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 150-153.
244
 LDAC Rules art. 7. See also ZHENG, supra note 210, at 151-152. 
245
 LDAC Rules art 7. See also ZHENG, supra note 210, at 153.
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event, these ‘non-state’ representatives may not be present in many 
of these cases, which can be heard by individual arbitrators.246
Under these conditions, labor arbitration crosses over into 
bureaucratic implementation of the law, rather than constituting an 
autonomous dispute resolution procedure. Professor Zheng writes:
This model under which the administration is responsible 
for arbitration readily blurs the distinctions between 
bureaucrats and arbitrators, and between the formulation 
and implementation of policy. [ …] To a certain extent, 
administrative guidance, order-making, and unilateral 
compulsion are in conflict with detachment, fairness, 
balance and trust necessary for arbitration.247
246
 Union representatives were involved in only 30,396 of the cases in 2003: 
Zhongguo Falü Nianjian [Law Yearbook of China] 2004, 603. 
247 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 139. See also at 204-205 (commenting that 
bureaucratic behaviors may intimidate parties and cause them to lose 
confidence in the process).
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Associated with this bureaucratization of arbitration is the low 
competence of many of the arbitrators.248 The main qualification 
for arbitrators is that they have engaged in labor dispute resolution 
work for more than three years or in related work for more than 
five years.249 There is an exam but it is not difficult to pass.250
Although there is provision for scholars and lawyers to serve 
concurrently as arbitrators,251 full-time arbitrators must be 
nominated from staff of the labor dispute section of the labor
department252 and many of these are transferees from other parts of 
the labor bureaucracy or retired army personnel.253
248 Id. at 154-158.
249
 LDAC Rules art. 16(4). 
250 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 157.
251
 Dispute Regulations art. 15
252
 LDAC Rules art 15.
253 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 156. 
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A further problem is that, although the published statistics suggest 
that employees receive a fair hearing, LDAC arbitrators face strong 
incentives to be biased against them. The law provides that they 
must recuse themselves if they have a conflict of interest and are 
prohibited from taking bribes.254 However, LDACs are often 
predisposed to favor local government and local business interests 
(often intertwined) to the detriment of individual workers.255 This 
may be because of corrupt financial inducements, but the structural 
reason why LDACs would not wish to offend local governments is 
that, as we have seen, they are dependent on labor departments for 
their resources and personnel, and those departments are in turn 
dependent on local governments for their resources and personnel. 
Finally, LDACs do not have jurisdiction where there is not an 
employer-employee relationship. As we have seen, Chinese labor
law does not explain in detail how to identify such a relationship; 
this leaves scope for the LDACs to determine it for themselves. As 
254
 Dispute Regulations arts. 35 and 38.
255
 Gallagher, supra note 211, at 74.
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mentioned above, many LDACs take a very narrow view of their 
jurisdiction256 – perhaps to reduce their workload – and are 
therefore likely to dismiss cases from workers who do not have a 
clearly identifiable employer. These workers may be the most 
vulnerable to violation of their contractual entitlements or their 
rights to safe working conditions.
Turning from the status and composition of the LDACs to 
questions of process, a first problem is that a party (usually the 
employer) is able draw out a dispute until the other party is 
exhausted.257 The relevant procedural rules require an LDAC to 
determine whether to accept an application within seven days of 
receiving it.258 If the LDAC does accept the application, it has a 
256
 For example, through rejecting cases where there is a labor relationship 
without written contracts: see supra note 219.
257 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 201-204.
258
 Dispute Regulations art. 25. If a LDAC declines to hear a matter on the basis 
that it does not constitute a labor dispute, a court can exercise jurisdiction 
over the matter if it determines either that it does constitute a labor dispute, or 
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maximum of 104 days within which to conclude the case.259 The 
arbitral award takes effect within fifteen days of service on the 
parties.260 Note at this point that, with respect to the two labor
abuses which are the focus of the article, this kind of process is 
likely to be much more relevant to remuneration issues than to 
hours of work (which require prompt and direct intervention in the 
workplace when the breach is occurring).
However, even with respect to remuneration, the procedure is 
problematic. If one of the parties is dissatisfied with the arbitral 
award, it can elect to commence court proceedings. This 
immediately prevents the arbitrated award from taking effect.261
The court process involves a de novo hearing at first instance, and 
then, if there is an appeal of the first instance judgment, a second 
because it otherwise has jurisdiction: Supreme Court Interpretation on Labor 
Disputes, supra note 68, art. 2. 
259
 Dispute Regulations arts. 25 and 32. 
260 Id. art. 30.
261
 Supreme Court Interpretation on Labor Disputes, supra note 68, art. 17.
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de novo hearing.262 Professor Zheng points out that this process 
places workers seeking to recover arrears in wages in a highly 
disadvantageous position; they not only face the prospect of
maintaining legal proceedings without their primary source of 
income (especially if they have been wrongly terminated), they also 
run the risk of the employer absconding, or removing assets from 
the jurisdiction.263 In the case of court proceedings, it is possible to 
obtain preventative orders, such as orders to preserve property and 
evidence.264 Most usefully, a court can order interim relief, 
including, specifically, in cases involving labor remuneration.265
Such orders can not be made by LDACs.266
262
 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa [Civil Procedure Law of 
the People’s Republic of China] (hereafter Civil Procedure Law) promulgated 
by the National People’s Congress, April 9 1991, Chapters XII –XIV.
263 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 167-170. See also the discussion in Ho, supra 
note 75 at 154-158  on fees and the availability of legal aid.
264
 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 262, Chapters VI and IX.
265 Id. arts. 97 and 98.
266 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 166-170.
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Not surprisingly, then, LDACs appear to be rarely used by 
migrant workers. Research by Thireau and Hua of data at the 
Shenzhen Labor Bureau suggests that LDACs are used to resolve 
disputes by wealthier, long-term, and frequently skilled workers.267
Other research suggests that these workers are overwhelmingly 
well-resourced males.268 On the other hand, poorer workers use 
oral or written complaints to the labor department as their principle 
means of trying to engage state institutions to deal with labor
abuses.269
267
 Thireau & Hua, supra note 161, at 90. See also JOSEPHS, supra note 77, at 
92-94.  Thireau and Hua, based on Shenzhen data in the late 1990s,  estimate 
the cost of arbitration proceedings at 2,361 yuan, or around four times the 
monthly wage of migrant workers lodging complaints with the labor 
departments:. Gallagher arrives at a much lower figure in Shanghai: 300 
yuan: Gallagher, supra note 211, at 59. 
268
 Fu & Choy, supra note 211, at 19. 
269
 Thireau & Hua, supra note 161, at 90. 
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The LDAC procedures may be contrasted to commercial 
arbitration where courts can make interim relief orders while 
arbitration proceedings are on foot270 and where arbitral awards 
cannot be appealed against on substantive grounds.271 Judicial 
review of commercial arbitration is possible only on procedural 
grounds.272
Even if a worker can sustain the expenses associated with an 
arbitration and/or court proceeding, and obtains an order in her or 
his favor,273 this may be of little avail. It is often very difficult in 
China to execute either arbitral awards or court judgments. As 
application for execution of arbitral awards involves court 
proceedings, in both cases the difficulty lies with the court 
compulsory execution process. It is well established that Chinese 
270
 Arbitration Law art. 28.
271
 Arbitration Law arts. 5 and 9. 
272
 Arbitration Law Chapter 5.
273
 Employees win a majority of court cases in many significant provinces, such 
as Guangdong: Fu & Choy, supra note 211, at 21. 
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courts are frequently unable to enforce their judgments.274 In an 
extensive study of the enforcement of civil judgments, Clarke 
identifies reluctance by courts to use coercive measures (especially 
where a defendant may not be seen as entirely at fault morally), 
lack of interest in execution, lack of finality in judgments, 
insolvency through enterprise restructuring, lack of cooperation by 
banks and reluctance by courts to execute against enterprises if it 
will lead to adverse consequences such as job losses as factors 
contributing to the problem.275 However, the factor that may be 
most serious is, again, local protectionism. This leads to courts 
deferring to the wishes of local elites and refusing to assist courts 
274
 Donald Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: the 
Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (1996); Jianfu 
Chen, Mission Impossible: Judicial Efforts to Enforce Civil Judgments and 
Rulings, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 85 
(Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 2002).  
275
 Clarke, supra note 274, at 35-40, 52-68. 
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from other parts of China enforce their judgments within the 
jurisdiction.276
A third problem is that the time limit within which claims may be 
brought to LDACs is unreasonably short. The Labor Law provides 
that a party must file with an LDAC within 60 days of the 
occurrence of a labor dispute.277 This is a very short period and 
many workers are likely to remain unaware of it until it has 
expired.278
A fourth procedural flaw is that labor arbitration is not subject to 
judicial supervision.279 As a court hears a labor dispute de novo as 
though it were an ordinary civil dispute, it does not concern itself 
with the conduct of the arbitration – that is irrelevant, so it is unable 
276 Id. at 41-52. See also LUBMAN, supra note 51, at 266-268.
277
 Labor Law art. 82; Supreme Court Interpretation on Labor Disputes, supra
note 68, art. 3.
278
 Fu & Choy, supra note 211, at 19-20.
279 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 175-178 
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to upbraid a LDAC for its poor adherence to process.280 Moreover, 
it would seem that administrative litigation proceedings cannot be 
invoked against a LADC.281 Thus, if members of a LADC refuse 
to recuse themselves despite a conflict of interest, or refuse to hear 
280 The position is therefore the opposite of commercial arbitration. John Mo, 
Probing the Uniformity of the Arbitration System in the PRC, 17(3) J. INT’L 
ARB. 1, 46-48 (2000).
281 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 233-234. It is not possible to commence 
administrative litigation against a LDAC on the basis that it has failed to 
make a decision or that it refuses to accept a case:  Zuigao Renmin Fayuan 
guanyu Laodong Zhongcai Weiyuanhui Yuqi bu Zuochu Zhongcai Caijue 
huozhe bu Yu Shouli Tongzhi de Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Renmin Fayuan 
Yingfou Shouli de Pifu [Reply by the Supreme People’s Court concerning 
Whether the People’s Courts Can Accept Labor Dispute Cases Where the 
Labor Arbitration Committee Has Failed to Issue a Decision within Time or 
Has Failed to Accept a Case], Fashi  24 of 1998, issued September 9, 1998. 
While a party can commence a civil procedure if a LADC declines to hear a 
matter, it is not explicitly clear that a court can exercise jurisdiction if an 
LADC simply fails to make a decision within the required time period: see 
Supreme People’s Court Interpretation on Labor Disputes, supra note 68, art. 
2.
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important evidence, a party to the proceedings is unable to compel 
them to do so. They may be subject to administrative sanctions 
only.282
Yet another procedural shortcoming is that the legal instruments 
regulating dispute resolution generally draw no procedural 
distinctions between individual and collective disputes. This is a 
legacy of central planning where industrial conflict did not take the 
same form as collective disputes in market-based economies.283
This means that the LDACs use the same procedures for a small 
individual dispute and a large-scale conflict that may involve 
considerable economic and social disruption, for instance where a 
factory suddenly closes, leaving thousands of workers unpaid.
To be sure, a distinction is made between collective disputes over 
vested rights and collective interest disputes, but it is of a negative 
282
 Dispute Regulations art. 38. LDAC Rules art. 26. 
283 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 141-146, 207-216.
119
kind. Disputes arising out of collective negotiation284 are excluded 
from the jurisdiction of the LDAC.285 Where collective 
negotiations break down, disputes are referred to labor departments 
directly for assistance, not to the LDACs. The LDACs only handle 
collective disputes arising out of the performance of a collective 
contract (i.e. vested rights).286
As far as court proceedings are concerned,287 there is no special 
labor law court or procedure288 and so labor cases are frequently 
treated the same as other civil (or sometimes administrative) 
284
 This is not collective bargaining: see Simon Clarke et al., Collective 
Consultation and Industrial Relations in China, 42 BRITISH JOURNAL OF 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 235 (2004)
285
 Labor Law art. 84. Jiti Hetong Guiding [Provisions on Collective Contract], 
promulgated by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security on January 20, 
2004, with effect from May 1, 2004, Chapter 7.
286 Id. art. 55.
287
 For more extensive accounts of the Chinese court system, see PEERENBOOM, 
supra note 51, at 280-342; LUBMAN, supra note 51, at 250-297.
288
 Labor cases are handled under the Civil Procedure Law, supra note 262. 
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disputes. While judges in the advanced coastal provinces may be 
familiar with the distinct nature of employment and industrial 
relations law, in other parts of the countries lack of specialization is 
problematic, especially when generalist judges encounter cases 
involving very serious industrial conflict.289 Moreover, Professor 
Zheng points out that many courts treat labor cases with disdain 
because they are time consuming and, the employee litigants 
generate little income for the court from fees.290
289
 Judges, prosecutors and lawyers generally have a very low understanding of 
labor law, and especially those aspects concerning trade unions: LIU CHENG, 
LUN GONGHUI DE DAIBIAO SUSONGQUAN [A Discussion of the Trade Union’s 
Right to Representative Litigation], paper delivered to the International 
Seminar on Labor Dispute Settlement, Peking University, 19th-20th
November, 2004 (on file with the author).
290 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 244-247; see also Fu & Choy, supra note 211, at 
21.
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Like LDACs, courts are plagued by problems of 
incompetence,291 although the quality of judges is improving in 
wake of moves to set higher qualifications and standards for judges 
on the part of the NPC and the Supreme People’s Court.292 On the 
other hand, corruption appears to be increasing. In a further 
manifestation of the ubiquitous institutional flaw - local 
protectionism - lower courts are financially dependent on their 
local governments, and the appointment and removal of their 
judges is controlled by local people’s congresses. As with the labor
departments and the LDACs, courts are very vulnerable to local 
pressure.293 They may either find in favor of the local financial 
interest, regardless of the merits, or delay making a decision 
adverse to that interest.294
291 PEERENBOOM, supra note 51, at 289-298, 320-323; Yuwen Li, Court Reform 
in China: Problems, Progress and Prospects, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 69 (Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 2002). 
292
 Li, supra note 291, at 72-76, 82-83.
293 PEERENBOOM, supra note 51, at 307-312. Li, supra note 291, at 59.
294
 Li, supra note 291, at 60-62. 
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Finally, court proceedings are expensive and there is inadequate 
legal aid for persons (such as individual workers) without means 
who wish to access lawyers,295 although more worker assistance 
organizations are gradually being established.296
D  ENFORCING THE RULES: UNIONS
Individual workers  confront serious obstacles in attempting to 
enforce labor law through engaging state enforcement and dispute 
resolution processes. Shortcomings in labor bureaucracies and 
dispute procedures are, of course, observed in very many 
jurisdictions. Nonetheless, in many countries, the injurious effects 
such shortcomings have on workers are counteracted by workers’ 
capacity to pursue compliance issues collectively, through their 
295 PEERENBOOM, supra note 51, at 362 -364. See also id. at 361-369 on access 
to competent and honest lawyers. Li, supra note 291, at 61-62. 
296 See infra note 418. 
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unions. In China, however, the extent to which lawful trade unions 
are responsible for compelling compliance with the law is 
determined by the state, not by ordinary union members. The 
compliance function of Chinese unions is thus really another aspect 
of state bureaucratic enforcement of labor law. Let us examine how 
far this compliance function contributes to the implementation of 
labor law.
China’s official trade union organization, the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), is the largest ‘labor
organization’ in the world, claiming a membership of over 130 
million, more than 300,000 full time officials and more than one 
and a half million base-level (that is, enterprise) unions.297
However, the ACFTU is not an organization controlled by its 
membership. It is subordinate to the Chinese Communist Party
297 See ACFTU website <http://www.acftu.org.cn/about.htm>. This states that 
the membership is 134 million and that there are 1, 713, 000 primary trade 
unions. 
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(CCP) and the state.298 This arrangement is spelt out both in the 
Trade Union Law299 and in the ACFTU Charter.300 The preamble 
to the Charter provides that:
Chinese trade unions are mass organizations of the working 
class formed voluntary by workers under the leadership of the 
Chinese Communist Party. They are a bridge and bond linking the 
party to the working masses. They are an important social pillar 
of national political power and a representative of the interests of 
members and workers.301
Furthermore, the principle of ‘democratic centralism’ ensures that 
lower level unions remain subordinate to higher-level entities, 
298 See e.g., TAYLOR AT AL, supra note 25, at 40-43, 102-123.
299
 Trade Union Law art. 4.
300 Zhongguo Gonghui Guicheng [Charter of Chinese Unions] (hereafter the 
Charter), passed by the 14th National Congress of the ACFTU on September 
26, 2003.
301 Id.
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culminating in the national ACFTU leadership.302 Although the 
Charter provides for enterprise-level union committees to be 
elected by members (and direct elections are apparently 
increasing)303 the elected candidates are subject to approval of 
higher-level union officials.304
Despite the fact that the ACFTU is recognized as a trade union 
organization by the ILO,305 its subordination to the CCP has led 
302
 Trade Union Law art. 9; Charter art. 9 Of course many unions in liberal 
democracies have rules that enable a national elected body to override a local 
constituent union, but they do not normally provide for control over local 
electoral processes.
303
 Grassroots Trade Unions Elect Own Leaders, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, May 
8, 2005: <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-
05/08/content_2931894.htm>.
304
 Trade Union Charter art. 27.
305
 A nominee of the ACFTU is currently a deputy member of the Workers’ 
Group in the ILO Governing Body:  
<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/refs/pdf/gbmember.pdf
>.
126
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to conclude 
that it is not a free and democratic trade union:
A government created and controlled union that has to 
uphold policies adopted by the government cannot at the 
same time credibly represent workers’ interests.306
As is well known, China does not permit unions to be formed 
without ACFTU approval307 and has harshly punished labor
activists who have attempted to do so.308 This is clearly in 
306
 See International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 'ICFTU Comments 
on the First Report submitted by the People's Republic of China in its 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 1966 (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 
2005) at 1.1.2.
307
 Trade Union Law art. 11.
308
 ICFTU, supra note 306, at Appendix 3.
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violation of the key ILO conventions on freedom of association,309
as the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association has repeatedly 
found.310 Despite this, there is very little prospect that China will 
substantially alter its stance on freedom of association in the short 
to medium term as the party-state sees dominance of labor
organizations as essential to its survival.311
The law, then, binds Chinese trade unions to the CCP and the 
state through the ACFTU structure and treats worker representative 
bodies outside this structure as illegal. However, the law goes 
beyond simply ensuring that the CCP/state have ultimate authority 
309 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention 
(ILO No 87) July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S 17; Right to Organize and Collective 
Bargaining Convention (ILO No 98), July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S 257.
310 See e.g., ILO Committee on Freedom of Association Reports Vol. LXXXVI, 
2003, Series B, No. 1 at 385-467, especially paragraph 465.
311 See ANN KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 128-45 
(1999) on the interaction between China and the ILO on freedom of 
association.
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over trade unions; it directs what functions the unions are to 
perform. It treats them essentially as state regulatory agencies. 
Among these mandated functions, a major responsibility of the 
trade unions is to seek employer compliance with the labor law. 
While this function was formerly expressed in vague terms,312 the 
2001 amendments to the Trade Union Law delineate specifically 
the areas in which unions are supposed to be particularly vigilant of 
employee rights and entitlements.313 Trade unions, for example,
are obligated to (yingdang) take action ‘on behalf of employees’ 
where enterprises misappropriate wages or arbitrarily extend 
working hours.314 The obligation to supervise enforcement of the 
law is repeated in the Charter,315 other statutes316 and legislative 
instruments at both national317 and regional levels.318
312 See art. 17 of the 1992 version of the Trade Union Law.
313
 Trade Union Law art. 22.
314
 Trade Union Law arts. 22(1) and (3). 
315
 Trade Union Charter art. 28(6). 
316 See e.g., Labor Law art. 88; Work Safety Law arts. 7, 52
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These provisions suggest that, while Chinese trade unions may 
not be worker representative organizations as understood in liberal 
democratic societies, they are nevertheless well positioned to 
protect worker entitlements where these are set out in the law, 
indeed they are directed to do so. Importantly, seeing that labor law 
is properly implemented does not, on its face, put unions in tension 
with the party-state. In fact, state policy actively promotes close 
collaboration between labor inspectorates and trade unions on 
enforcement issues, including through the nomination and training 
by labor departments of labor compliance supervisors within 
corresponding levels of the trade union structures.319
317 See e.g., Labor Inspection Regulations art. 7. 
318 See e.g., Guangdong Province Regulations on the Payment of Wages, supra
note 146, arts. 45, 46. 
319 See Guanyu Jiaqiang Laodong Baozhang Jiancha yu Gonghui Laodong 
Baozhang Falü Jiandu Xianghu Peihu Gongzuo de Tongzhi [Notice 
concerning Strengthening the Coordination of Labor Protection Inspection 
and Trade Union Labor Protection Supervision], issued jointly by the 
MOLSS and ACFTU, November 13, 2001, with immediate effect, cl 5. 
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In principle, official Chinese trade unions could be a much more 
effective force for securing compliance than labor department 
inspectors. According to official data, union officials outnumber 
inspectors by more than seven to one320 and unlike labor
inspectors, officials of base-level unions are located within 
enterprises and so can conduct ongoing monitoring. In particular, 
base-level unions are ideally placed to prevent unreasonable 
working hours. 
Unfortunately, for many reasons, the compliance function of 
Chinese unions remains weak. 
First, the legal powers available to a union to compel an employer 
to adhere to the law are inadequate. Where a union identifies a 
violation of the law, it has no direct remedy against the employer. 
Its power is essentially limited to raising the issue with the 
320
 Compare the statistics at, supra notes 207 and 297.
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employer and seeking its response.321 It has no substantive legal or 
industrial weapon at its disposal and is dependent on other agencies 
to apply sanctions – in most cases either the labor inspectorate322
or a LDAC.323 As we have already seen, these agencies have 
problems of their own. 
321 Art 22 of the Trade Union Law provides that on discovering a violation, the 
union shall (1) negotiate with the enterprise on behalf of the employees and 
(2) require the enterprise to adopt measures to correct the situation.  
(‘…daibiao zhigong yu qiye, shiye danwei jiaoshe, yaoqiu qiye, shiye danwei 
caiqu cuoshi yuyi gaizheng’): Trade Union Law art. 22. The employer is 
obliged to respond but there is no specific penalty for failing to do so.  
Compare, e.g. Labor Law art. 88: Work Safety Law art. 52; Guangdong 
Province Regulations on the Payment of Wages art 45.
322
 If an employer refuses to respond to a union request to comply with the law: 
Trade Union Law art. 22.
323
 Unions can invoke labor arbitration if the firm breaches a collective labor 
contract: Trade Union Law art. 20. If a firm breaches an individual contract, 
it is obliged to (yingdang) ‘support and give assistance to’ an individual who 
takes a case to a LDAC or to court: art. 21. 
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As for industrial sanctions, there is no right to strike in China, 
even where there is a life-endangering hazard in the enterprise.324
Strikes are not expressly prohibited by labor legislation – although 
they can easily fall foul of the many laws and regulations dealing 
with public order. However, the Trade Union Law in effect casts a 
duty on trade unions to prevent industrial action. Where industrial 
action occurs in an enterprise, the union is required to ‘express the 
employee’s views, negotiate with the employer and propose a 
resolution’. It cannot lead a stoppage but, on the contrary, is 
enjoined to help the enterprise ‘resume production as quickly as 
possible’ and ‘restore work discipline’.325 This is consistent with 
one of the other state-mandated functions of Chinese trade unions –
324
 Trade Union Law art. 24.  A union may only suggest to the employer that 
work cease.
325 Id. art. 27. Union officials frequently seek actively to prevent or defuse 
industrial action on the basis of the ‘national interest’: Feng Chen, Between 
the State and Labor: The Conflict of Chinese Trade Unions' Double Identity 
in Market Reform, 176 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 1006, 1018-1022 (2003).
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to date the most prominent one – to mobilize employees to 
participate in economic construction.326
Second, many enterprise level unions are dominated by 
management. Indeed, union officials may themselves be enterprise 
managers.327 This is clearly in conflict with the ILO principles on 
preventing interference with union autonomy328 as well as the 
326
 Trade Union Law art. 7.
327
 Gallagher, supra note 36, at 26-28, 32-33. Clarke et al, supra note 284, at 
241-244. They state that ‘it is the dependence of the trade union on 
management, rather than its dependence on the Party, that is the main barrier 
to the development of an industrial relations system in China: id. at 241.
328
 Art 2 of the ILO’s Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 
supra note 309, provides: 
1. Workers' and employers' organizations shall enjoy adequate protection 
against any acts of interference by each other or each other's agents or 
members in their establishment, functioning or administration. 
2. In particular, acts which are designed to promote the establishment of 
workers' organizations under the domination of employers or employers' 
organizations, or to support workers' organizations by financial or other 
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position in most industrialized countries where legislation and/or 
the internal rules of unions prevent management dominance of 
unions. The key role managers play in many Chinese enterprise-
level unions is a legacy of an economy in which most enterprises 
were socialized and workplace relations were based on 
administrative arrangements rather than contract. According to CCP 
ideology, since firms were owned by the state and workers were the 
‘masters of the state’, there could be no serious conflict of interest 
between the aspirations of the workers and the management of 
enterprises. Collective bargaining and strike action were foreign to 
unions, and it was not unusual for union officials to hold senior 
management positions. During this period, the primary roles of 
unions were to participate in allocating enterprise-based social 
welfare benefits, mediate labor-management disputes and maintain 
production order.329
means, with the object of placing such organizations under the control of 
employers or employers' organizations, shall be deemed to constitute acts of 
interference within the meaning of this Article.
329 See e.g., TAYLOR ET AL, supra note 25, at 103-107.
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Of course, economic arrangements in the Chinese labor market 
have been undergoing a process of radical change since the mid-
1980s. Many state and collec tively owned enterprises have been 
privatized, private firms now employ a majority of the workforce 
and workplace relations are now based on contract. In the private 
sector, at least, there can be no pretence that the interests of firm 
managers and workers are now entirely congruent. In such firms, 
the involvement of senior managers in the trade unions is especially 
inappropriate.330 In the context of enforcement of labor law, it is 
obvious that a manager in a firm that has breached obligations to its 
employees will be tempted to prevent a union taking action against 
the firm or assisting a worker to take such an action. If the firm 
manager is also the union secretary, then union support for 
enforcement proceedings is unlikely to be forthcoming. 
Observation confirms this: in many wage arrears cases, for 
330
 Taylor et al report from their fieldwork that in some localities, the ACFTU 
has agreed to allow private firm managers to appoint the union chairperson 
because of pressure applied by local government authorities: id. at 127. 
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example, the union official has actively represented management in 
arbitration proceedings.331
The 2001 revisions of the Trade Union Law make considerable 
progress in protecting union members from retaliation by a firm.332
A firm which violates these protective provisions may face 
fines,333 reinstatement and compensation orders334 and, in some 
circumstances, criminal sanctions.335 Moreover, the Law states that 
‘close relatives of those chiefly responsible for running a firm’ 
(qiye zhuyao fuzeren) cannot be candidates for election to union 
331
 Greenfield & Pringle, supra note 26, at 36; see also Ching Kwan Lee, From 
Organized Dependence to Disorganized Despotism: Changing Labor 
Relations in Chinese Factories, 157 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 44, 58 (1999).
332 See Trade Union Law arts. 50-54.
333 See Labor Inspection Regulations arts. 29-30 (fines stipulated are between 
2,000 and 20,000 yuan).
334
 Trade Union Law arts. 51 and 52. 
335 Id. art. 50 (obstructing employees by means of violence or intimidation from 
joining a trade union, or obstructing higher level trade unions assisting 
employees to establish a trade union).
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committees at enterprise union level. It also provides for trade 
union officials to be democratically elected or recalled.336
However, crucially, the Law does not prevent managers themselves 
being elected.337
Third, there are limited means through which members can 
compel their unions to protect their entitlements or to represent 
them, as the law requires. The Trade Union Law obliges unions to 
assist individual workers who commence proceedings in a LDAC 
or in the courts.338 One of the important revisions to the Trade 
Union Law made in 2001 was to confer an express right on trade 
unions to litigate directly where an employer violates a collective 
336 Id. arts. 9 and 17.
337
 Any person for whom wages are a major source of income is entitled to 
become a trade union members and to elect and be elected to office in a 
union: id. art. 3; Trade Union Charter arts. 2 and 3(1). This would presumably 
prevent an owner of a firm becoming a union member, but not a firm’s 
executive officers. 
338
 Trade Union Law art. 21.
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contract.339 The relevant union can take the employer to a LDAC 
and then to court.340
There are many disputes in which unions do in fact assist 
workers.341 However, there are many other circumstances (apart 
from straightforward management domination) in which the unions
decline to help, especially if facts are disputed or there is a large 
collective dispute. As Feng Chen has pointed out, where it occurs, 
the involvement of unions in compliance issues tends to be case-
based rather than focusing on underlying structural issues which 
lead to abuses becoming endemic.342
339
 Trade Union Law art. 20. See also art. 49.
340 Id.
341 See e.g., those cited in Chen, supra note 325, at 1012-1017.
342 Id. at 1017. Chen writes that ‘representing workers in open protests creates 
an image of organized action, which is politically risky and, indeed, the last 
thing unions want to be part of. Organized action per se, no matter what the 
reason for it, its basis and its targets, is taboo’: id. at 1016.
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Where unions refuse to help workers, they cannot be legally 
required to exercise these powers. Although courts are beginning to 
entertain nonfeasance complaints by union members, there has not 
as yet been an unequivocal decision in which a union has been 
directed by a court to perform its statutory function of representing 
workers.343 At present, individual union members dissatisfied with 
their representation must essentially direct their complaints to the 
next level of the union hierarchy.344
Even where a union does seek to represent workers in litigation, it 
encounters significant obstacles, as Professor Liu Cheng points 
out.345 For example, it is not clear what procedural rules apply, and 
union officials in the enterprise unions have a poor knowledge of 
labor law.346
343
 Kai Chang, Collective Bargaining: Problems and Solutions, 11(4) 
INTERNATIONAL UNION RIGHTS 3 (2004).
344 Id.
345 CHENG, supra note 325.  
346 Id.
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Fourth, where Chinese unions do attempt to assist workers, their 
efforts have not been directed to those workers who suffer from the 
most egregious violations of the law. Either unions are not present 
in those enterprises where the worst violations occur or they 
exclude from membership the worst affected workers. Despite the 
apparently large number of union members and union officials, at 
best only around 30% of private enterprises are unionized,347 and 
even in the unionized firms, the union structures often exist only on 
paper.348
347 CHANG, supra note 343, at 4; see also Daniel Ding et al., The Impact of 
Economic Reform on the Role of Trade Unions in Chinese Enterprises, 13 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 431 (2002). 
On the conduct of unions in various kinds of private sector firms see: 
Gallagher, supra note 36, at 26-31.
348
 On the top-down approach to organizing taken by the ACFTU, see Chen, 
supra note 325, at 1025. On the ineffectiveness of unions in many private 
firms, see Ding et al, supra note 347, at 445-46; Ding et al comment that, in 
many of the private firms they surveyed, unions were operating more like ‘a 
141
Of still more consequence, the ACFTU did not until very recently 
attempt to represent or act in the interests of migrant workers at all. 
Migrant workers, being from rural areas, were classified as 
agricultural workers (nongmingong) and therefore not part of the 
‘working class’ participating in the union. Chinese unions have 
focused on representing urban workers with long-term contracts 
and we have seen that such workers generally enjoy much better 
working conditions than migrant workers.349
The position has now changed, at least in a formal sense. In 2003, 
the ACFTU issued a circular stipulating that all migrant workers 
family and entertainment office of the HR department’ than as branches of a 
nation-wide trade union organization: id.
349
 Local surveys indicated that very few migrant workers participated in unions 
prior to the 2003 policy change: Jiu Mingong Jiaru Gonghui, Laodong 
Bumen Ying Ti Mingong Shuohua (Only 3.6% of Rural Workers Join 
Unions; Labor Departments Should Speak Up For Them), March 14, 2003, 
Nanfang Dushi Bao (reporting survey commissioned by the firms in 
Shenzhen).
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are entitled to join trade unions, irrespective of their hukou status or 
their work experience.350 Since then, the organization has issued 
further notices, actively encouraging its constituent unions to 
recruit migrant workers.351 According to some official reports, 
these efforts have been astonishingly successful, with massive 
increases in migrant worker membership.352 However, such claims 
should be treated with skepticism until more detailed empirical 
evidence confirms whether officials trade unions are now in fact 
more effective in protecting the legal entitlements of migrant 
workers.
350 Union Accepts Migrant Workers, CHINA DAILY, September 3, 2003. 
351 E.g. Guanyu Zuzhi Gezhong Suoyouzhi, Shiye Danwei Ji Jiguan de 
Laowugong Jiaru Gonghui de Tongzhi (Notice on Organizing Laborers to 
Join Unions in Business Enterprises with All Kinds of Ownership Structures, 
and Non-profit Enterprises Organs) issued on October 30, 2004. 
352 Chinese press reports make the astonishing claim that in the month after this 
notice was issued 34 million rural workers joined trade unions: Migrant 
Workers Flock to Join China’s Trade Unions, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY 
September 21, 2003: <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-
09/21/content_1091989.htm>. 
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E  TOWARDS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE RESPONSE TO 
UNDERPAYMENT OF WAGES? 
Chinese labor law’s internal defects seem to provide little hope 
that it will steer workplaces away from abusive practices. However, 
an overly pessimistic conclusion is not justified: there is a high 
degree of dynamism in the process of legal reform in China. This 
opens up sites for progressive intervention, so that certain useful 
changes to the law may be feasible. Let me illustrate this by 
discussing a recent important legal initiative, one showing that,
paradoxically, one of the apparent difficulties with the Chinese 
system of labor regulation – its jurisdictional fragmentation – can 
in fact lead to productive innovation.
Several provincial and municipal governments have been trying 
to improve the regulatory framework dealing with underpayment of 
wages. One of the most comprehensive efforts came into effect at 
the beginning of 2005. The Guangdong Province Regulations on 
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the Payment of Wages (the ‘Guangdong Wage Regulations’)353
brings together in one well-ordered document many of the 
principles on wage determination and wage enforcement scattered 
in various national and local legal materials. It also makes 
significant innovations.
The Guangdong Wage Regulations clarify how wages are 
defined,354 the form in which, and the person to whom, they must 
be paid,355 and the relationship between wages and individual and 
collective contracts.356 They stipulate how the minimum wage and 
penalty rates are to be calculated, including in relation to piecework 
and accumulated hours schemes.357 The Regulations set out the 
353 See supra note 146.
354 Id. art. 54
355 Id. arts. 10-11.
356 Id. arts. 8 - 9.
357 Id. arts. 4, 8, 18, 10, 20, 21, 22. The provisions do not apply to irregular 
hours schemes: art 23.
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entitlement to wages where work stoppages occur,358 where there 
has been a wrongful termination359 and when a worker takes sick 
leave, holiday leave and other forms of leave.360 They also ensure 
that workers will receive remuneration when they are engaged in 
representational activities361 (such as work for the union or 
workers congresses, and participation in the negotiation of 
collective contracts).362
358 Id. art. 35.
359 Id. arts. 13, 29.
360 Id. arts. 12, 19, 24, 25. They also stipulate when payment must be made.
361 Id. art. 26.
362 Some may find this overly prescriptive and consider that many of these 
matters should be determined by individual arrangements. The prescription 
is at least to some extent necessary because of (1) the absence of many 
contract default rules; (2) the likelihood of disputes and abuses arising where 
no clear legal rules exist.; and (3) the unsophisticated nature of much 
workplace bargaining. On the latter point, see e.g., TAYLOR ET AL, supra note 
25, at 192-195. It is also responding to the concrete experience of wage 
conflicts over the last twenty years of labor market reforms. Note also that 
employers can ‘opt-out’ of the rules pertaining to overtime and leave 
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In relation to the vague terms in the Labor Law we examined 
above (‘misappropriation’ and ‘payment in arrears without 
justification’), the Guangdong Regulations indicate what types of 
deductions are lawful and other types of deductions constituting 
misappropriation.363 They do not use the expression ‘without 
justification’; instead they detail how labor departments are to deal 
with degrees of employer tardiness and obstruction.364
Unfortunately, though, they do not state categorically that the 
payment of a bond on commencement of employment is unlawful. 
While the systematic stipulation of key rules on remuneration is a 
very significant advance on the fragmentary state of the law at the 
payments where they engage staff that fall within in the categories enabling 
irregular working hours schemes to be introduced: Guangdong Province 
Regulations on the Payment of Wages, supra note 146, art. 23.
363 Id. arts. 10, 14, 15. These reflect the Temporary Regulations on the Payment 
of Wages, supra note 99.  
364
 Guangdong Province Regulations on the Payment of Wages, supra note 146, 
Chapters 3 and 4.
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national level, the most important aspect of the Guangdong Wage 
Regulations is their treatment of enforcement and compliance. In 
addition to the measures we have already seen, the Guangdong 
Wage Regulations include a number of provisions that strengthen 
the enforcement process. 
First, firms are required to implement their own compliance 
systems. All firms must establish and make public to their 
workforce a wages scheme which indicates how wages are 
determined and varied, when they are to be paid, how overtime is 
to be paid, and which deductions may lawfully be made.365
Individual workers are entitled to be informed of the content of the 
scheme.366 Firms must also keep detailed records on wages for two 
years. The records must indicate matters such as wages paid, how 
the wages are related to time worked and any deductions made.367
Individual workers receive their own pay slips that must be 
365 Id, art. 7. 
366 Id.
367 Id. art. 16.
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consistent with the general firm records.368 In the event of any 
dispute, the onus is on the employer to show that it has produced 
these records; if the employer does not produce them, employees 
may be deemed to be unpaid.369
Second, the Guangdong Wage Regulations broaden legal liability 
for wages where formal legal structures have been shown to 
prejudice employees, such as to individual partners of insolvent 
partnerships,370 to head contractors in building projects,371 and to 
successor firms following merger or division.372 This goes some 
way towards addressing the failure in the Labor Law to deal with 
‘boundary’ issues.373
368 Id. art. 17. 
369 Id. arts. 17, 44
370 Id. art. 30
371 Id. art. 33
372 Id. art. 34.
373 See supra, Part III.A.5.
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Third, the Regulations set up a public warning system for firms 
significantly in arrears.374 The labor department can notify the 
public of the firm’s poor record through the media, at employment 
agencies and by notices in the firm itself.
Fourth, a firm’s legal representative (such as the general manager 
or head of the board of directors) can be personally fined for a 
firm’s non-compliance with the regulations. This is the case, for 
example, where a wages scheme is not established, records are not 
kept375 or where industrial conflict breaks out and the manager 
fails to attend on the spot within 24 hours.376 If the conflict arises 
because a firm has attempted to relocate in order to avoid paying 
374
 Guangdong Province Regulations on the Payment of Wages, supra note 146, 
arts. 37, 41. Where firms are either two consecutive months in arrears or three 
months in total, they are to be recorded within the labor department for 
possible action. Firms with good compliance records are to be positively 
evaluated and recorded.
375 Id. art. 48. 
376 Id. art. 51.
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wages, the legal representative can be detained by the public 
security bureau or arrested.377
The Guangdong Wage Regulations indicate that it is possible to 
develop clear substantive norms regulating remuneration in a 
systematic manner. They also deploy compliance strategies that are 
far more sophisticated than those in the national law. The critical 
question is of course how well this important initiative will operate 
in practice. It is too early to know. 
IV . PROSPECTS FOR BETTER IMPLEMENTATION
Despite progressive initiatives such as the Guangdong Wage 
Regulations, the overall impression from this analysis is that there 
are very serious flaws in the law relating to payment of wages and 
working hours and the implementation of that law. Some of these 
problems are specific to labor law (such as the labor disputes 
377 Id.
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system and the peculiar legal status of Chinese trade unions) while 
others concern the legal system as a whole (such as the disorderly 
state of legal norms, local bureaucratic corruption and the 
difficulties with enforcing court judgments).
One way in which researchers outside China might contribute to 
improving the formulation of and compliance with the labor law is 
to draw on our own societies’ experience of regulatory 
implementation, to the extent that those experiences are relevant in 
the Chinese context. I attempt to do that in this Part. I begin with a 
discussion of the relative strengths of different regulatory 
approaches in the Chinese context and then proceed from this to 
offer a number of reform proposals.
A  ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY APPROACHES
China’s approach to formal (or state-based) regulation in general, 
and to labor regulation in particular, heavily favors ‘command and 
control’. For several decades now, command and control 
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approaches have been severely criticized in the regulatory literature 
of industrialized societies.378 Command and control is premised on 
the ability of a regulator to craft rules and enforcement mechanisms 
which both address in a comprehensive manner the social problem 
that prompted the regulatory intervention and foresee and avert the 
potential adverse effects of the intervention itself. The complexity 
of social relations and the scarce resources available to regulatory 
agencies make this frequently unachievable. Consequently, 
command and control regulation often tends towards excessive 
bureaucratization and legalism, and resistance by the regulatory 
target379 (although as I point out below, there are some 
circumstances in which it may still be the preferable strategy). 
378 See e.g., EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE 
PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982). Problems include 
ever more complex rule-making, rigidity, strategies of evasion and creative 
compliance on the part of the regulated, distortion of regulatory intent by 
implementing agencies, high enforcement costs and enforcement failures.  
379 See e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992). 
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Furthermore, many studies demonstrate that the ‘command’ is 
very often transformed when it is placed in the hands of officers in 
regulatory agencies. The agencies’ interpretation of the legal rules 
they enforce is refracted through their own systems of values and 
practices, which affect matters such as the priority accorded to 
remedying different kinds of violations, and the nature of the 
sanction deployed. It follows that the practical implementation of 
legal rules by regulatory agencies can depart far from what the 
original drafters of the legal rules intended.380
In response to these adverse effects, many scholars, including in 
the field of labor law, have described a range of complementary 
and alternative regulatory approaches. These approaches have 
frequently proved themselves superior to ‘command and control’ in 
380 See e.g., KEITH HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT (1987). John 
Paterson & Gunther Teubner, Changing Maps: Empirical Legal Autopoiesis, 
7 SOC. & LEGAL STUDIES 455 (1998).  
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practice.381 They have involved efforts to make law more 
‘responsive’382 or ‘reflexive’,383 enlisting the co-operation of those 
subject to it through establishing connections with their own frames 
381 See e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 379; Michael Dorf & Charles 
Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
267 (1998); Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern 
Law, 17 LAW AND SOC. REV. 239 (1983); Gunther Teubner, Juridification: 
Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in Juridification of Social Spheres: A 
Comparative Analysis in the Areas of Labor, Corporate, Antitrust, and Social 
Welfare Law (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987) ; David Hess, Social Reporting: A 
Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L.
41 (1999); CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELF-
REGULATION AND DEMOCRACY (2002). In the area of labor law, see: Orly 
Lobel, Orchestrated Experimentalism in the Regulation of Work 101 
MICHIGAN L. REV.2146 (2003); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of 
the Workplace in an Era of Self-regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2005).
382 See e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 379.
383 See e.g., Teubner (1983), supra note 381; ROGOWSKI, supra note 20.
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of reference,384 and/or radically reconfiguring legal institutions on 
democratic experimentalist lines.385 One common theme in these 
approaches is the coordinated ‘decentring’386 of responsibility for 
both the creation of regulatory norms and their implementation to 
multiple actors (including especially local non-state actors), albeit 
usually with oversight from and accountability to governmental 
institutions (‘metaregulation’). In some instances, the literature 
attempts to integrate ‘corporate social responsibility’ initiatives into 
regulatory frameworks, although these initiatives have also elicited 
considerable skepticism.387
384 See generally, HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 62-9 (1999) 
(noting that private law of contracts fits closely with a model of responsive 
regulation).
385 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 381.
386
 Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation 
and Self-regulation in a Post-regulating World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL 
PROBLEMS 103 (2001) at 106-111. For a related analysis in the field of labor 
law, see Mark Barenberg, Labor Federalism in the United States: Lessons for 
International Labor Rights, 2001 J. INT’L ECON. L. 303. 
387
 Cooney, supra note 177, at 308-314.
156
A second theme is the encouragement of local democratic 
deliberation – the participation of those most affected by the social 
problem that calls for a regulatory response. A third theme is an 
emphasis on local experimentation in the development of responses 
to social problems, which, when monitored and evaluated, yields a 
dynamic learning process that generates ongoing improvements in 
regulatory norms and mechanisms. 
B  THE FEASIBILITY OF ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY 
APPROACHES IN CHINA
While alternative regulatory approaches offer a way to escape the 
pitfalls of command and control, it is doubtful how far they can be 
applied in the Chinese context. After considering whether 
regulatory alternatives to command and control (and in particular 
democratic experimentalism) can be implemented in China, Randy 
Peerenboom concludes that:
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both greater reliance on private actors and more bottom-up 
experimentalism rely on the infrastructure of a modern 
state, including a legal system that meets basic rule-of-law 
requirements, democratic elections and an active civil 
society. But that infrastructure is not yet in place in 
China.388
He cites many serious obstacles to alternative regulatory 
approaches in China. The list is formidable: the adherence to 
democratic centralism; the absence of strong, autonomous, civil 
society organizations and the lack of independent vehicles for 
diffusing and critiquing information; low education and literacy 
levels; the likely hostility of the bureaucracy to alternative 
approaches; the likely resistance of local governmental institutions 
to requirements of information disclosure and external monitoring 
and evaluation (vital to the effectiveness of those approaches); the 
prevalence of corruption among both state and private actors; 
388 PEERENBOOM, supra note 51, at 431.
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widespread intolerance of diverse viewpoints, inhibiting reasoned 
deliberation; and weak judicial institutions.389
While Peerenboom is writing in general terms about the Chinese 
regulatory environment, analysis in this article confirms that the 
obstacles he identifies are present in an acute form in the field of 
work relations. This suggests that reflexive strategies for regulating 
labor relations in Chinese firms will be difficult to implement. Take 
for example mandated social reporting.390 This relies on the 
generation and distribution of accurate information, but agencies 
and employers frequently falsify information and obstruct 
monitoring and evaluation. Even where sophisticated systems of 
corporate responsibility codes and social audits have been 
implemented by foreign multinationals operating in China, they 
have often floundered in the workplaces operated by their Chinese, 
389 Id. at 428-431.
390 See e.g., Hess, supra note 381; Cooney, supra note 177, at 334-337.
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Taiwanese and Korean subcontractors.391 If major multinational 
corporations, motivated by strong consumer pressure and able to 
devote considerable resources to supplier monitoring, encounter 
great difficulties in securing compliance with labor standards, it is 
very unlikely that Chinese legislation requiring firms to disclose 
their social performance will be effective. 
Even more significantly, the civil society organizations most 
relevant to more participatory forms of workplace regulation –
organizations of working people – are either subordinate to the 
party-state, top-driven and frequently aligned with management, or 
actively suppressed. Moreover, as we have seen, the lawful worker 
organizations have, at least until very recently, done very little to 
give voice to migrant workers – the socially and economically 
marginalized people whom Chinese labor law is most deficient in 
391
 This is most clearly demonstrated in the extensive empirical work of LIU & 
TAN, supra note 34. See also NIKE, FY04 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
REPORT (Nike, 2005) Part II Section 4, which indicates a number of 
compliance problems in China.
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assisting. Migrant workers’ low educational levels and social status 
often leave them unwilling and unable to articulate their concerns; 
unless they receive institutional support, they will not be able to 
contribute to local regulatory processes. 
Overall, circumstances are not very promising for new 
approaches displacing the current command and control mode of 
regulation. Norm-setting and enforcement will continue to be 
focused on state agencies.392
That said, there is still some scope for regulatory experimentation 
and decentralization. This scope is fairly wide within the state 
apparatus. In the post-1978 period, China has frequently taken an 
incremental, localized and experimental approach to economic and 
social reform.393 This approach has extended to labor regulation: 
there have been rolling improvements in legal norms and 
392 PEERENBOOM comes to a similar conclusion for the legal system as a whole, 
supra note 51, at 431.
393 Id. at 427-428.
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enforcement strategies, as the Guangdong Wage Regulations 
(themselves the product of experimentation at the local municipal 
level)394 illustrate. To be sure, these initiatives do not devolve 
regulatory power away from state entities (although they shift it 
from the central government). They do not involve affected citizens 
in collaborative problem-solving (other than through ‘their’ quasi-
state organization, the ACFTU). They mainly consist of a series of 
commands coupled with punishments (although they try to prompt 
firms to build internal compliance systems). Their profusion also 
makes the Chinese legal landscape unstable and complex. 
Despite all this, Chinese norm-making practice is a relatively 
nimble form of coordinated decentralization (especially when 
compared to law-making in major federal systems). It has enabled 
the ongoing revision of labor norms and processes and the 
simultaneous trialing of a diverse range of regulatory innovations. 
394
 John Chen, Wage Arrears Fuel Discontent, CHINA LAW BULLETIN, August 
31, 2002. 
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It has given law some prospect of responding to the accelerating 
changes in, and the diversification of, Chinese work relations.
Moreover, even non-state initiatives experience some success. 
Many Chinese workplaces are affected by decentred forms of 
regulation, particular those associated with ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ initiatives in global supply chains. I have noted that 
many of these are plagued by disingenuous compliance and false 
information flows. But, as I discuss further below, not all of these 
initiatives fail.
In sum, labor reform proposals need to recognize that the basic 
‘command and control’ orientation of labor regulation will persist
in China. Within that orientation, there is some scope for 
experimenting and for integrating insights from alternative 
regulatory approaches in order to construct more sophisticated 
labor enforcement strategies. But wholesale adoption of 
decentralized, participative, approaches is not viable while 
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corruption is endemic and worker organizations are subverted by 
democratic centralism and management interference.
C  SOME SUGGESTIONS
The following suggestions aim to improve compliance with labor
law, particularly the entitlement of workers to be paid for their 
service and to work reasonable hours. They assume that there is no 
impending radical change to China’s regulatory practices. They 
seek to recognize and respond to the limitations of those practices, 
and to the wider political, economic and social contexts of Chinese 
work relations.
1  Clarification of Key Norms
Basic labor laws norms need to be clarified through the 
enactment of further legislation on labor contracts and wages, and a 
review of the provisions on working hours, especially the ‘opt-out’ 
procedures. We can be optimistic in relation to wage issues. As we 
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have seen, the legislative amendment process is already well 
advanced at the provincial level.395
On working hours, the position is more difficult. In many 
industrialized countries, there has been a shift away from setting 
absolute substantive standards on working hours to more 
procedural approaches, with direct employee involvement. For 
example, in the European Union, employees have a right to refuse 
to work more than 48 hours a week on average.396
In contrast to these approaches, which seek (imperfectly)397 to 
give effect to employee preferences, China mandates working 
395 See supra Part III.E.
396
 Council Directive concerning Certain Aspects of Working Time 93/104/EC, 
23rd November 1993. See generally the discussions in WORKING TIME AND 
WORKERS' PREFERENCES IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES (Jon Messenger ed., 
2004); JILL MURRAY, TRANSNATIONAL LABOR REGULATION: THE ILO AND 
EC COMPARED (2001). 
397 See e.g., Murray, supra note 396.
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hours for firms, regardless of employee wishes, but gives wide 
discretion to labor bureau to enable employers to derogate from the 
mandated scheme. China may therefore need to revise the 
conceptual foundations of its approach at some point. Nonetheless, 
it seems to me preferable to remain with core aspects of the (ILO-
inspired) substantive approach at present, at least with respect to 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers. Those workers do not have true 
representative organizations through which to inform themselves 
and express their preferences about working hours. Their low 
education and frequently tenuous residency status, together with 
remuneration difficulties arising from the arrears problems, suggest 
that the specification of a standard is still necessary. That standard 
should continue to be set at the points in excess of which prolonged 
periods of work give rise to serious health consequences, namely 
around the fifty hours per week mark and six consecutive working 
days.398 It is obviously also necessary to specify more carefully the 
circumstances in which employers can opt out of the norms.399
398
 See supra, Part III.A.4.
399
 As the Beijing Working Hours Regulations do, supra note 130.
166
A further problem for the current hours regime is, however, that 
in some sectors of manufacturing industry, economic pressures on 
firms are so severe that there seems little immediate prospect of 
bringing hours into conformity with the law. Should then, a more 
realistic standard be specified? Rather than rewriting the law, 
eroding the standards, and altering existing entitlements (the law 
being reflected in individual and collective contracts), it would be 
better to factor the practicalities of compliance into a gradated 
enforcement strategy (as discussed in the following section). Those 
firms with working hours that are most injurious to health should 
be targeted by enforcement agencies and unions in a co-coordinated
way.
Another challenging task for legal norm-creation is the need to 
address new forms of working relationships that cannot easily be 
accommodated within the labor contract/contract for services 
divide. The ideological insistence that a labor contract is radically 
different from other forms of contracting, although admirable in 
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seeking to avoid the commodification of labor, does not assist in 
practice. Decentralized legislative experiments are needed to 
develop ways of assisting dependent workers who do not fall 
clearly within the present definition of employee or where the 
identity of the employer is uncertain. Such experiments will also 
allow for greater responsiveness to local conditions (and industry 
structure).400 The provisions in the Guangdong Wage Regulations 
dealing with construction sites are an example of how innovation 
may be achieved.401
2  More Effective Sanctions
A number of fairly obvious changes to the institutions responsible 
for implementing the laws are needed. One line of reforms would 
be to increase the enforcement powers of the labor bureaucracy and 
400
 Of course, such experiments ought to involve participation from the people 
most affected by the regulation, but this is clearly not going to be feasible 
under present conditions.
401
 Guangdong Province Regulations on the Payment of Wages, supra note 146, 
arts 33 and 34.
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the quasi-state agency that is the ACFTU. I noted above that these 
are quite weak and fail to outweigh economic incentives to flout 
the law. The suggestion is bound to be controversial. It is a classic 
‘command and control’ response to a regulatory problem, and 
perpetuates the pathologies associated with the bureaucratic 
mentality. Worse, increasing sanctions available to Chinese state 
agencies, notorious for abuse of discretionary power (not least 
against labor activists), may be viewed by many as retrograde.
Nonetheless, at least in the context of the two abuses we have 
been examining, bolstering enforcement powers is defensible and 
indeed desirable. As many regulatory scholars acknowledge, 
despite the undoubted deficiencies of command and control 
approaches, there are circumstances in which the specification of a 
clear standard accompanied by an effective penalty is 
appropriate.402 This may be so where a regulated firm is 
persistently recalcitrant and failing to correct its deficiencies where 
402 See e.g., NEIL GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART REGULATION: 
DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 41-42 (1st ed, 1998). 
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it is clearly feasible for it do so. The case for a heavy-handed 
approach strengthens where a firm’s actions cause considerable 
suffering, as in occupational health and safety breaches.403 The 
persistent and willful failure to pay due wages, and the imposition 
of health-threatening working hours, fall into this cate gory.
At present, the strongest weapon in the labor department’s armory
is the fine, and fines are often difficult to collect. These are not 
sufficient to make up for arrears or to curb excessive labor hours. 
True, labor departments can refer matters to other state agencies for 
tougher penalties, but those other state agencies will often not be 
familiar with the principles governing labor relations. One way to 
increase the powers of the unions and the labor bureaucracy would 
be to enable them to order the suspension of production or business 
for a specific period, until the law is complied with. As we have 
seen, this is a penalty wielded by other administrative agencies.404
403 NEIL GUNNINGHAM & RICHARD JOHNSTONE, REGULATING WORKPLACE 
SAFETY: SYSTEMS AND SANCTIONS 183-291 (1999). 
404 See Administrative Punishments Law, supra note 167 art. 8(4).
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This power could be exercised in the more egregious circumstances 
of unpaid wages and excessive working hours, where command 
and control strategies are likely to be more effective. 
A rule might specify that a labor department may order cessation 
of production in order to bring an enterprise into compliance with 
the law where staff have been working for more than eleven 
consecutive hours405 or six consecutive days.406 Similarly, a rule 
might specify that where staff had not been paid for more than two 
months, production would cease for a certain period. 
A closure power would give inspectors much greater clout. 
Admittedly, conferral of increased powers poses the risk of 
arbitrary abuses and adverse consequences often associated with 
command and control measures. However, we have seen that 
405
 The maximum time that hours can be extended in any one day under the 
Labor Law; see supra note 116.
406
 Labor Law art. 38.
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administrative reforms leave employers well placed – perhaps too 
well placed – to challenge inappropriate administrative action.407
In any case, the best protection against abuse of increased powers 
– and the most effective way to deploy them – is for labor
departments, led by the MOLSS, to integrate them into a 
comprehensive and systematic enforcement strategy. Ayres and 
Braithwaite’s concept of the ‘enforcement pyramid’ is relevant 
here.408 Low-cost enforcement strategies such as persuasion and 
warning are more easily deployed against non-compliant firms in 
the first instance, but where they are met with defiance; the 
enforcement agency can threaten sanctions of increasing severity. 
Firms, knowing that regulatory agencies can ultimately impose 
very severe punishments, may take their advice and warning more 
seriously. As Ayres and Braithwaite write:
407 Supra notes 194-198 and accompanying text. 
408 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 379, at 35-38.
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Regulatory agencies have maximum capacity to lever cooperation 
when they can escalate deterrence in a way that is responsive to 
the degree of uncooperativeness of the firm, and to the moral and 
political acceptability of the response.409
Labor departments cannot at present escalate up the enforcement 
pyramid to closing a firm’s operations. This undermines the 
effective use of even those weak sanctions they already have.410
3  Improving Dispute Resolution
Labor dispute resolution institutions also need major revision, 
along the lines proposed by Professor Zheng411 and many other 
409 Id. at 36.
410
 Chinese state agencies might also consider financial incentives for good 
performance. Such measures, though, depend on the accuracy of information 
about firms, so it is dubious how far they can be implemented credibly in the 
Chinese context. OGUS, supra note 150, at 246-254; GUNNINGHAM & 
GRABOSKI, supra note 402, at 69-83.
411 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 179-222.
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Chinese scholars.412 First, the requirement that arbitration always 
precede litigation should be abolished, especially when a worker 
simply wishes to recover outstanding wages. Second, LDACs 
would benefit from a greater institutional independence from the 
labor bureau and from better-trained personnel. 
Third, more specific procedures for different kinds of labor
dispute (rights/interest; collective/individual) seem appropriate, and 
greater powers to assist workers left without income as a result of 
lengthy dispute resolution proceedings. Such procedures should 
also, as Professor Liu argues, clarify how unions can exercise their 
representational rights in arbitration and court proceedings.413
They should also enable LDACs to grant interim relief.
412
 The support for these ideas was evident from the participants (leading 
Chinese labor law scholars and labor officials) in the International Seminar 
on Labor Dispute Resolution, held at Peking University Law School, 19-21 
November 2004. I was able to take part in the seminar.
413 LIU, supra note 298.
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Fourth, the scope of ‘labor dispute’ should be broadly interpreted 
to cover sub-contracting arrangements that involve dependent labor
(who may not technically be employees). One possibility would be 
to enable LDACS to entertain disputes between independent 
contractors in certain circumstances, as occurs with ‘unfair 
contract’ legislation in several international jurisdictions. 
4  Trade Union Reform
If China observed ILO conventions on the right to organize and to 
bargain collectively, compliance with labor law would almost 
certainly improve. Under present political circumstances, however, 
it is unrealistic to think that China is prepared to do this. However, 
if Chinese unions cannot lawfully become fully autonomous 
worker organizations, they can at least become more effective 
compliance agencies. There are several ways in which this could 
occur. 
First, unions should have a power to direct workers to cease 
production analogous to that proposed above for labor department 
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inspectors. This would in effect confer a power on unions to call a 
strike, albeit one that, formulated by reference to administrative 
enforcement mechanisms, is linked to the enforcement of state law
and does not constitute a challenge to government policy on public 
unrest. In any event, such strikes over existing entitlements occur 
on an informal basis very frequently and at present appear to be 
tolerated. This would provide a means of both legitimizing and 
regulating them.
A further, crucial, move would be to render Chinese trade unions 
more independent from firm management, especially in the private 
sector. Ideally, the Trade Union Law would be amended to require 
this. However, further amendment of the recently revised Law 
would most likely be a cumbersome and contentious process. 
Internal measures within the ACFTU, such as directives from 
higher-level union bodies to grassroots unions located in firms may 
be just as effective if done systematically. Democratic centralism, 
while generally an obstacle to trade union autonomy, does have its 
potential benefits. Higher-level unions, could, for example, 
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systematically refuse to affirm (pizhun) the election of firm 
managers to trade union offices at grass root level. 
Such a move might arouse the ire of local governments in areas 
where they have particularly corrupt links with business.414 Strong
central government support for greater union autonomy from firm 
managers would be required to successfully implement it. Union 
independence from management could also be encouraged by 
judicial recognition of the right of union members to take 
nonfeasance actions against their union officials where they have 
been unreasonably refused assistance.
Even if these measures were adopted, they will not assist the most 
vulnerable workers unless the ACFTU is able to mobilize its 
enterprise unions to take up the issues of migrant workers. We have 
seen that there is no longer a structural obstacle to this within the 
organization.415 Moreover, at a rhetorical level, the ACFTU 
414 See supra note 199.
415 See supra note 350.
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appears committed to renouncing its previous exclusionary 
practices. Yet it will take a considerable change in the mentality of 
local union cadres (overwhelmingly drawn from among the more 
privileged urban employees with their prejudices against migrant 
workers) to give practical effect to this.
The shortcomings of the ACFTU are so great as to suggest that 
substantial improvements to its compliance function, such as those 
proposed here, cannot be achieved. This is not necessarily so. There 
are certainly many within the organization attempting to make it 
more representative of worker interests and in some regions such as 
Shanghai, Shandong and Jiangsu, the municipal/provincial 
federations seem to be relatively effective.416 Furthermore, the 
Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL), the ACFTU’s 
socialist counterpart across the southern border, has been much 
more aggressive in forcing private firms to comply with labor
416 TAYLOR ET AL, supra note 25, at 129.
178
standards.417 The ACFTU could  take a lead from its more active 
elements and from the VGCL and provide genuine assistance to 
workers in private firms. If, on the other hand, the organization
fails to confront the reality of oppressive management treatment of 
workers in many private firms and persists with its ‘mediating’ 
approach to dispute resolution, it will be, at best, irrelevant to those 
workers.
5  Coordination between State and Private Sector Initiatives
In addition to improving individual state-based compliance 
mechanisms, there needs to be greater coordination between those 
mechanisms and private sector initiatives (self-regulatory 
measures). While Chinese civil society is tightly controlled, and 
firms resistant to notions of corporate social responsibility, there 
are nevertheless many significant private sector attempts to 
improve labor conditions, including ensuring that workers are paid 
417
 Anita Chan & Hong-zen Wang, The Impact of the State on Workers' 
Conditions-Comparing Taiwanese Factories in China and Vietnam, 77(4) 
PACIFIC AFFAIRS 629 (2004-05). 
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for work performed and do not work unreasonable hours.418 One 
major source of these private sector initiatives is multinational 
corporations whose supply chains are anchored in China. Under 
often intense consumer pressure, many multinational corporations 
have attempted to require their subcontractors to improve working 
conditions.419 Many of these private sector initiatives fail in the 
face of perfunctory and disingenuous participation by sub-
contractors, lack of participation by the affected workers and an 
unwillingness and/or inability of multinational corporations to 
establish effective monitoring and compliance systems.420
418 See HILARY MURDOCH & DANIEL GOULD, CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY IN CHINA: MAPPING THE ENVIRONMENT, GLOBAL ALLIANCE 
FOR WORKERS AND COMMUNITIES 63-71 (2004). 
419
 In any case, major international firms must take more responsibility for the 
pressure they place on their suppliers to cut costs. They must themselves bear 
some of the financial burden of improving working conditions: see LIU & 
TAN, supra note 34, at 81-82.
420
 For example, Liu and Tan write of a company with over 6,000 employees 
which has adopted a code of conduct limiting working hours, as required by 
its major client, an international footwear company, and has stationed a 
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Nonetheless, multinational firms are continually reworking their 
initiatives in the face of criticism, and have occasionally come up 
with credible and creative compliance strategies, especially where 
they collaborate with multi-stakeholder groups such as the Ethical 
Trade Initiative or SA8000.421
It is not only multinational firms that are devising methods of 
raising compliance with labor law. There are an increasing number 
of actors outside the labor bureaucracy and the ACFTU that are 
attempting to improve Chinese working conditions.422 These 
include groups with links to non-government organizations
(particularly in Hong Kong),423 free-standing research and training 
permanent auditor. However, the workers informed investigators outside the 
factory that they nevertheless worked twelve to fourteen hour days, id. at 75.
421 See MURDOCH & GOULD, supra note 418, at 72-76. 
422 See the catalogue of groups in MURDOCH & GOULD, supra note 418, at 35-
61.
423 See, e.g., the Chinese Working Women Network: see Ngai Pun & Wai Ling 
Chan, Community Based Labor Organizing, 11(4) INTERNATIONAL UNION 
RIGHTS 10 (2004); see <http://www.cwwn.org>. 
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institutes,424 advisory services associated with Chinese
universities,425 some parts of the All China Women’s Federation426
and some individual Chinese firms.427 Even the Chinese 
government, at both the national and provincial levels, is now 
promoting ‘corporate social responsibility’.428
The range of initiatives in labor regulation occurring in both the 
state and non-state spheres could be more productive if there were 
better channels for coordinating and evaluating them. If each 
measure is pursued in isolation, there is the potential for wasted 
424 See e.g., the Institute for Contemporary Observation: <http://www.ico-
china.org/>; and the Asia Monitor Resource Centre: 
<http://www.amrc.org.hk/>. See also 1 (10) CSR ASIA WEEKLY (2005).
425 See e.g., the legal clinics operated by the Law School at Sun Yat-sen 
University in Guangzhou and at East China Normal University in Shanghai.  
426 See <http://www.women.org.cn>. 
427 CSR in China’s Supply Chains, 1 (15) CSR ASIA WEEKLY (2005).
428 China’s NPC, CSR and Social Harmony, 1 (12) CSR ASIA WEEKLY, Vol 
(2005). 
182
resources through the simultaneous and independent adoption of 
overlapping and even inconsistent strategies. To be sure, some 
private sector initiatives are implemented in consultation with state 
agencies and official trade unions. But this is too ad hoc and firm 
specific. For systematic evaluation of measures to occur, co-
ordination must occur across a range of firms within an industry or 
geographic area. Moreover, when a measure is successful, there 
needs to be a way of diffusing it: that is, enabling knowledge of it to 
become widespread. 
Is there space to establish institutions that could coordinate and 
evaluate new labor initiatives in China? Aside from the serious 
obstacles to implementing alternative regulatory approaches 
already mentioned, there are further problems with coordinating 
institutions. If an institution is concerned solely with private 
initiatives, then it will fail to coordinate with state and quasi-state 
regulatory measures and may even provoke bureaucratic hostility 
and obstruction. On the other hand, if the institution examines both 
private and state measures, it will need to involve state actors and 
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would therefore risk either being dominated by the state 
bureaucracy with its command and control mentality (at the 
national level) or being captured by corrupt state-business networks 
(at the local level). Nonetheless, I will sketch out how such 
institutions might work. 
A locality in China (preferably one with a relatively efficient and 
progressive government and a relatively capable trade union 
organization) could support the establishment of a multi-party 
agency, or committee, which would collect, evaluate and diffuse 
information from various sources about methods used to improve 
compliance with labor law. Instead of simply working to coordinate 
the efforts of labor departments and official trade unions, which 
already occurs,429 the committee would include representatives 
from firms and from non-state actors. The agency could seek the 
cooperation of these actors on pilot studies. 
429 See supra, note 319.
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For example, a pilot study could be conducted on ways to reduce 
excessive working hours or reducing the problem of arrears.430 The 
pilot studies could focus on particular industries (such as textiles 
and clothing) or on particular kinds of firms (such as small and 
medium-sized domestic enterprises). It would seek to develop both 
an accurate picture of enforcement patterns in the locality and to 
assess which enforcement strategies were effective. Those 
strategies could include the command and control methods of the 
labor bureaucracy, the ‘supervision’ of trade unions, self-regulation 
by firms and initiatives from social actors.
Each of the constituents could contribute to the pilot study by 
drawing on its particular regulatory strengths.431 Local labor
430
 The Guangdong Province Regulations on the Payment of Wages currently 
provide for firms to be evaluated in relation to their payment systems, with 
some firms recorded (literally) in the ‘good books’ and others punished 
through publication in the media: supra note 146, art. 41. However, this 
evaluation is to be conducted by labor bureau alone.
431
 The agency would not have enforcement powers as such since these are 
already wielded by the labor departments.
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bureaus could map out their compliance strategies and use their 
investigation powers under the Labor Law and other legislation to 
gain data about firm enforcement,432 imposing sanctions for non-
disclosure.433 Trade unions could invoke their own inspection and 
monitoring powers under the law. Local and, even more 
importantly, international, firms could indicate what new measures 
they had made to improve compliance. The social organizations
could provide information (which may well be the most reliable 
data) to cross-check the other sources.
The co-coordinating committee would determine what initiatives 
were promising and successful. It could then:
• publicize the initiatives widely, including to other firms, to 
social organizations and to labor bureaus;
• use the initiatives to determine what is ‘best practice’ in the 
industry, advise firms to comply with best practice; and help the 
labor bureaus, unions and other social organizations to insist that 
432
 For example, Labor Law arts. 85-87.
433 Id. art. 101.
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firms adopt it;
• suggest to the labor bureaus that those firms which had 
developed successful initiatives be financially rewarded; and
• assist the labor bureaus to identify, criticize and (in cases of 
refusal to improve) punish poor performers.
This process would be dynamic. Evaluation of best practice 
would change from year to year (or according to another time 
frame) as firms develop new and better ways of improving 
conditions. 
This proposal entails, in some industries at least, an 
acknowledgement that very many firms do not comply with the 
law. However, if firms are, in good faith, pursuing measures to 
improve their working conditions, the fact that they are at present 
in violation of the law need not attract a punitive response from 
labor departments unless they are engaging in practices involving 
imminent danger to workers or other severe illegality. If firms knew 
that they would be punished for less serious breaches, despite 
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taking serious steps to improve, they would have a powerful 
disincentive against disclosing the real situation in an enterprise.
Fortunately, the structure of labor law enforcement provisions is 
commonly to empower labor departments to give warnings or issue 
correction orders (zeling gaizheng) prior to imposing a fine. 
I emphasize that this proposal is quite speculative. It is quite 
likely that the circumstances in China will severely limit the 
capacity of such a scheme to produce demonstrable and widespread 
changes in workplaces.434 It is admittedly very difficult to see the 
scheme flourishing in the face of the authoritarian political 
environment, bureaucratic institutional mindsets and the propensity 
of firms to evade, deceive and subvert regulatory agencies of 
whatever design. Nonetheless, as such a scheme has the potential to 
achieve practical improvements in addressing the arrears and 
excessive hours issue, it is worth keeping the idea in the public 
arena. 
434 See supra, note 416.
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6  More General Legal Reforms
The reforms proposed to date have all been specific to 
‘protective’ labor law. Obviously, the prospects for success of those 
proposals are closely tied to wider reforms to legal institutions. 
Other writers have extensively canvassed such reforms and I will 
not examine them in depth here. The main areas where ongoing 
improvements are needed will be obvious to anyone reading this 
article. They include matters such as (in relation to broader labor
law) further dismantling of the hukou system and (in relation to the 
legal system more generally) more effective anticorruption 
measures focusing on local government-business networks, better 
means of enforcing legal judgments and better judicial training to 
name but a few.435
435
 See e.g., PEERENBOOM, supra note 51; Chen, supra note 51; Chan & Zhang, 
supra note 46; LUBMAN, supra note 51.
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7  Campaigns and the media
While legal reforms may lead to better enforcement, there are of 
course non-legal means of addressing labor abuses.436 The Chinese 
state has often resorted to campaigns to target social problems such 
as criminal activity437 and environmental pollution. The campaigns 
involve the mobilization of party members and the coordinated 
concentration of state agency resources on the social problem. At 
times the campaigns have included resort to extra-legal measures, 
although more recently state action is likely to be in accordance 
with law. 
A strong campaign against labor abuses initiated by government 
may induce labor departments, police and other relevant agencies 
to deal more firmly with recalcitrant firms. A major advantage of a 
campaign is that it leads departments to co-ordinate. Thus, while as 
we have seen, labor departments do not have effective enforcement 
436
 This is a major topic in its own right but can be dealt with only briefly here.
437
 Bidduplh, supra note 52 at 62-86 on the ‘hard strike’ anti-crime campaigns; 
Van Rooij, supra note 202 at 169-177 on environmental pollution.
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powers on their own, the capacity to sanction is strengthened if 
they can credibly threaten police action in egregious cases. There is 
evidence that such co-ordination is beginning to occur. In early 
2006, in what seems to have been a municipal government 
campaign, eight firm owners in Shenzhen were detained for 
economic crimes in connection with failure to pay wages – the first 
time such action has been taken in China.438
However, campaigns have a significant drawback – they are 
ephemeral. Once a campaign ceases, attention and resources may 
be directed to other issues. The problem may reemerge, unless there 
are institutional reforms which complement the campaign.439
Another powerful means of addressing labor abuses is the media. 
The Chinese media regularly highlights labor abuses440 whether as 
438
 Stephen Frost, China View Vol 2(3) 8-9 CSR ASIA WEEKLY (2005).
439
 Van Rooij, supra note 202 at 172-174.
440 Chan, supra note 2 at 4-7. The accounts in Chan’s study are based on media 
reports of incidents which Chan has often further investigated
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part of a campaign or as a result of the work of individual 
journalists. Media exposure of injustice can lead to swift 
governmental intervention redressing the wrong. Benjamin 
Liebman notes that many Chinese believe the media is more 
effective than the legal system for citizen redress.441 Nonetheless, as 
with campaigns, the media is not a substitute for legal reform. As 
Liebman also points out, the media is an unreliable ally and can 
create injustices through misrepresentation and sensationalism.442
Moreover, while the media can be extremely useful in bringing 
worker abuses to the public’s attention, it is not well placed to 
address systematically the deficiencies which produce them
V. CONCLUSION
Out of the wreck of the Cultural Revolution, China’s leaders have 
built an economy that is gaining an ever greater share of world 
441 Benjamin Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese 
Legal System, 105 Colum. L.J. 1, 127-130 (2005), 7.
442 Id.
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manufacturing. They have thereby raised the living standards of 
hundreds of millions of citizens. Notoriously, this manufacturing 
success is marred by widespread labour abuses, epitomized by the 
sweatshop staffed by suffering migrant women workers. 
Domestically, rising labour disputes and evidence of emerging 
labour shortages stoke demands for policy reform.
Better regulatory strategies are needed to deal with widespread 
labour abuses. If we confine ourselves to what is feasible rather 
than what is ideal – accepting that radical change to China’s legal 
and political institutions is unlikely in the short term – then those 
strategies must be devised having regard to the existing
institutional context. This entails a specific analysis of where those 
institutions are deficient and where there are openings for 
improvement.
The analysis undertaken here has focused on underpayment of 
wages and excessive working hours. The legal norms directed at 
preventing these abuses needs to be more coherently elaborated and 
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public accessible, although there are already considerable 
improvements being made at the provincial level. 
Much more challenging is the problem of securing compliance. A 
fundamental difficulty here is that the key state enforcement 
institutions – labor departments, dispute resolution bodies and the 
official trade union – continue to employ bureaucratic methods 
increasingly anachronistic in China’s private-sector driven labor
markets. They operate with little active participation from the 
persons most affected by labor abuses and with little connection to 
emerging private sector initiatives directed at creating better 
workplaces. Current thinking in regulatory theory suggests that this 
approach is misconceived but the scope for introducing alternative 
regulatory models remains limited.
Despite the limited room to maneuver, many improvements to 
enforcement institutions can be implemented under current 
conditions. I have sought to identify several; these are mainly 
extrapolations of processes already underway or based on internal 
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critiques from Chinese scholars and officials. In the face of a 
society governed by an illiberal regime, plagued by pervasive 
corruption and dysfunctional legal institutions and segregated by 
internal migration controls, the proposals may seem modest and 
peripheral. I do not pretend to suggest that they will radically alter 
working relations. Given the complexity of the social systems 
impacting on the workplace and the relative absence of empirical 
data on how law interrelates with those systems, the impact of the 
reform proposals cannot be predicted; they must be provisional and 
revisable. They are nonetheless worth implementing as a response 
to present flaws. 
Finally, the development of feasible proposals to reduce labor
abuses enables international actors concerned with poor working 
conditions – governments, businesses, unions and human rights 
organizations – to formulate strategies targeted at achieving 
specific reforms feasible in the Chinese context. It enables them to 
engage with sympathetic Chinese actors without ipso facto putting 
those actors at risk. It may also enable them to directly improve the 
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lives of the many exploited workers at the hub of world industrial 
production. 
